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ABSTRACT
Climate change emerged as a high-level global issue in the Rio Earth Summit (1992). In
the United States, the Clinton Administration was the first to associate climate and security in
official documents. Since then, there has been an overall tendency to consolidate climate security
in political discourses in the United States. Based on the Copenhagen School criteria, analysis of
speeches by Post-Cold War U.S. governments (Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama,
Donald Trump, and Joe Biden), and a review of each Administration’s climate change policies
demonstrate how climate securitization has evolved in the United States. Climate securitization
has evolved as a nonlinear process characterized by periods of progress and reversals of narratives
and securitizing measures with a strong influence of partisanship.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Article 1 of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC)
defines climate change as "a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human
activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural
climate variability observed over comparable time periods." For most of Earth's history, climate
variability was caused by many factors but fundamentally natural causes. The anthropogenic
factor originates from human activity responsible for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, especially
since the Industrial Revolution, in the last two hundred years. The emissions primarily stem from
the burning of fossil fuels and industrial, agricultural, or land-use activities, which release to the
atmosphere carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), and other gases. In 1945,
"the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere was just 310 PPM or 11% higher than its preindustrial concentration around 280 PPM. By 2016, it had increased to 401 PPM or 43% higher
there the pre-industrial level" (Dryzek & Pickering, 2019, p. 91). Secondarily, human activities
also produce aerosols, altering the Earth's energetic balance by reflecting or absorbing the received
solar radiation.
The greenhouse gases reinforce the greenhouse effect - the greater retention of heat in the
atmosphere. The consequence of the greenhouse effect is global warming, defined by the U.S.
National Academy as "an average increase in the temperature of the Earth's surface and in the
troposphere, which can contribute to changes in global climate patterns.” The average temperature
of the planet's surface has risen about 1.18 degrees Celsius since 1800. 1 Most of this temperature
increase occurred in the last three decades. Climate change is a broader term that refers to higher
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NASA, 2020. Global Climate Change. Retrieved from https://climate.nasa.gov.
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temperatures on the planet caused by human activities but encompasses other changes in climate
patterns caused by global warming. 2
Climate impacts are not manifested in new problems but in situations that will become
more intense and more often worldwide and affect more people, such as extreme weather, sealevel rise, droughts, etc. Furthermore, climate change is a threat multiplier. Climate change can
indirectly increase the risks of conflicts by amplifying their causes, especially poverty caused by
failed crops and other economic shocks. Climate change may increase migrations, which may
add pressure to borders, foster international disputes for natural resources, or deepen fault lines
that already exist in societies.
Though causality between human activities and global warming was established by science
at least since the 1950s and 1960s, the end of the Cold War in 1989 is correlated with worldwide
attention to climate change, which was established as an international theme at the United Nations
debates, first at the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), by the end of the 1980s.
Moreover, the end of the Cold War challenged the classical security view based on state-centrism
and military power and opened the possibility for broadening the security agenda, including
environmental security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). In the Post-Cold War context, in a pioneering
effort, the Copenhagen School responded to the call to reconceptualize security. The Copenhagen
School emerged at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute in Copenhagen and is represented by
the writings of Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, Jaap de Wilde, and others.
The Copenhagen School is best known for its theory of securitization, which will be
constitute the theoretical framework of this thesis. In the constructivist tradition, the Copenhagen
School describes securitization as the discursive construction of a particular issue as a threat:

2

Despite these differences, "climate change" and "global warming" are often used interchangeably. "Climate
change" has become the predominant expression in speeches more recently.

3
"securitization can be defined as the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader)
of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant
constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of "normal politics" in dealing with
that issue" (McDonald, 2008, p. 567).
In the international context, climate change was consecrated as the first global
environmental problem in the Rio Earth Summit (1992).3 In the United States, the Clinton
Administration was the first to associate climate and security in official documents. Besides
emphasizing environmental security in political speeches and official documents, President Bill
Clinton created in the Department of Defense a new sector to deal specifically with environmental
security (Broda-Bahm, 1999).
Since the Clinton Administration, there has been an overall tendency to consolidate
environmental security, notably climate security, in political discourses in the United States.
Nevertheless, this process has not been linear, notably due to different perspectives between
Republicans and Democrats on the environment. Different views on security issues, depending on
partisan views, have produced differences and discontinuity in discourses and policies, notably in
climate. Conservatives and liberals tend to construct their speeches highlighting ontological threats
and security priorities in distinct ways (Dunlap et al., 2016).
This situation has led to the research question that guides this thesis. "How has climate
security evolved in high-level United States political speeches in the post-Cold War? To answer

3

The Rio Summit represented the apogee of environmental multilateralism praised by observers, the media
worldwide, and NGOs to start a new international cooperation era. Two U.N. principles govern the Climate
Convention: equality, which stipulates that each country has one vote, and the principle of "shared but differentiated
responsibility," making a difference between developing and developed countries in terms of efforts. All States have
the shared responsibility to protect the environment and promote sustainable development, but with distinct burdens
due to their different contributions to environmental degradation and their diverse financial and technological
capabilities. The Climate Convention also establishes the Conference of the Parties (COP), its supreme body
bringing together all signatory parties and which, since 1995, has met annually (Bodansky, 2016).
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the research question, the first part of this thesis will discuss why the security agenda has globally
expanded in the post-Cold War and how the partisan factor influences the United States' policies
on climate change. The empirical part of this thesis, the speech analysis, will be based on the
criteria established by the Copenhagen School. These discourses will be contextualized through a
review of climate change policies by the U.S. Administrations in the historical period concerned,
which will add more factual elements besides the interpretative research. The results will be
established by contrasting the outcomes of the speech analysis and the policy review.
The justification for choosing this thesis theme is twofold. First, climate change has
become one of the most important issues in international politics, presenting the broadest and more
severe threats to humankind. Climate change studies need a constant update since environmental
issues are very politicized; significant shifts can happen. Second, the importance of following the
development of climate security in the U.S. Administration stems from the country's relevance in
building security at the global level. Since World War II, the United States has been the most
significant world hegemon, controlling international institutions, having an unparalleled military
might. The U.S. high-level discourses impact not only domestic policies but also international
relations. The country is an essential actor in the security in the global system; it can influence the
collective representation of threats and the choice of measures necessary to overcome them.

2

CLIMATE SECURITIZATION: GLOBAL TENDENCIES

Several factors have contributed to the politicization and progressive securitization of
climate change. There has been a widespread trend towards politicizing ecological problems,
notably since the 1960s. Moreover, the end of the Cold War binary logic subverted security views
that almost exclusively emphasized state-centrism and military power and allowed the emergence
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of "soft issues," such as the environment, on the political agenda (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). This
trend is also inseparable from global crises, the expanding role of international organizations, and
the progress of science, enabling societies to understand the threats imposed by climate change.
2.1

The End of the Cold War
An analysis of the international context at the end of the Cold War is relevant for two major

reasons. Besides a correlation between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of global
politicization of climate change and its treatment as a security issue, the end of the bipolar conflict
broadened the security agenda in the academic domain. The Copenhagen School is tributary of the
new currents of thought that searched to reconceptualize the notion of security in the post-Cold
War.
At the end of the Cold War, critical international developments led to the consolidation of
climate security in global speeches. In 1988, the growing awareness concerning climate threats
lead to the organization by the World Meteorological Organization of the World Conference of
the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security in Toronto. The 1988 Toronto
Statement establishes a clear association between climate change and security: “Far-reaching
impacts will be caused by global warming and sea-level rise, which are becoming increasingly
evident as a result of atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases"
(Lanchbery & Victor, 1995, p. 32).
In the same year, 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was
created. The IPCC is a scientific intergovernmental body under the auspices of the United Nations.
Scientists and other experts contribute voluntarily to the IPCC to write or review reports. IPPC
reports contain a "Summary for Policymakers," which is subject to governmental review. The
IPPC first report was published in 1990, and by this year, the climate change issue was established
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in top-level political debates. The IPPC prepared the background information for the discussions
at the 1992 Earth Summit.
One year before the official end of the Cold War, in the 1989 Malta Summit, and three
years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Mikhail Gorbachev had already translated
in a speech in the 1988 United Nations General Assembly new perspectives on security that
emerged in the final years of the Cold War: "The relationship between man and the environment
has become menacing. The threat from the sky is no longer missiles but global warming"
(Trombetta, 2008, p. 591).
On December 26, 1991, the USSR was dissolved: The Cold War, the nearly 50-year pattern
of U.S. - USSR competition, came to a sudden end. The end of the Cold War had a determinant
impact on views on security, which was no longer seen only in terms of defense or military power
but also in political, economic, social, and environmental aspects. For Baldwin (1995, p. 141), the
post-Cold War U.S. policies would resemble again in some aspects security issues of the period
1945–1955, with a greater emphasis on nonmilitary aspects of security.
The traditional concept of national security is concerned with protecting the State's
integrity against armed attack. This perspective on security is found in Realism, which sees threats
essentially presented by other States. For Hobbes' classical Realism, "man is jeopardized primarily
by man." Only the State's power can prevent the "Bellum omnium contra omnes" ("war of all
against all"), which would result from the anarchy of the natural state. Realism has a negative view
of the State's power, whose primary function would be to curb the violent human nature. In this
perspective, security is guaranteed by the building of offensive and defensive military capacities).
Hans Morgenthau's book Politics among Nations in 1948 had a remarkable influence on the
movement in the post-war period.
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Realism has been a major source of inspiration in international relations and Security
studies, which have developed notably after the second world war, mainly from 1955 to 1965
(Walt, 1991). In post-World War II, threats represented by nuclear weapons gained central
importance in international security concerns. National security was based on military might and
access to technologies (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Funke, 2011, p. 72). However, nuclear weapons
led to assured mutual destruction, which meant that the United States and the Soviet Union could
launch a devastating nuclear attack. Thus, a defense strategy would be impossible in the case of
War (Powell, 2003, p. 88). The importance of armaments and military power continued to be
debated, but new conceptual approaches or more advanced analytical tools were necessary (Walt,
1991, p. 216).
Moreover, the end of the Cold War was a theoretical challenge for realist thinking. Classic
realists and neorealists could not predict or explain the sudden end of the bipolar conflict.
According to Structural Realism, the Cold War would continue to an indefinite future as it was a
stabilizing factor in the international system, which prevented major wars between superpowers
due to the balance of power. As late as 1988, the structural realist Kenneth Waltz argued that the
Cold War "was firmly rooted in the structure of post-war international politics and will as long as
that structure endures" (Wohlforth, 1994, p. 101). The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991
further puzzled realist analysts as it happened without an international conflict between the two
hegemons and considering that Russia continued to be a military nuclear superpower.
If much of the security studies emphasized only strategic and military aspects during the
Cold War and legitimized the bipolar logic, the end of the Cold War had a determinant impact on
widening the security agenda (Baldwin, 1995). Buzan and Hansen (2009) highlight that three
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major currents in security studies evolved in the post-Cold War: "traditionalists," "wideners," and
the "deepeners":
a) The "traditionalists" continue to claim, in line with Realism, state-centrism, and military
power as the central security elements. The State is the referent object of security, which means
that sovereignty and territorial integrity must be preserved. The primary security concern is thus
the threat of an external military attack.
b) The "wideners" seek the expansion of the security agenda. The traditionalist view did
not seem sufficient to explain the new reality: insecurity threatens States and individuals who live
under State power. New issues such as the peaceful end of the Cold War, the recrudescence of
domestic conflicts, the concern with immigration in the developed world, environmental crisis, the
Aids pandemic suggested that traditional analysis could not explain the post-Cold War scenario
(Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 7). The "wideners" argue that the State continues to be a referent
object of security but believe new themes ("soft themes") should be included in the security agenda
if they can impact the State. The expansion of the security agenda may involve military issues
such as domestic conflicts or nonmilitary themes such as population displacement and climate
change.
c) The "deepeners" argue that security should contribute to human emancipation and that
state-centrism in security deviates the debate from the centrality of the human being. Individuals
should be security's primary focus and referent object, not the State. Security should include social
themes, such as unemployment, feminism, health, criminality, etc.
The Copenhagen School's theoretical perspective can be classified within the group of the
"wideners." The School has a broad view of security: threats originate from the military sphere
and the political, economic, environmental, and societal spheres. Concerning the notion of
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security, the Copenhagen School does not deviate very far from a traditional view. The
Copenhagen School broadens the notion of security but does not necessarily deepen it. Security
for the Copenhagen School is still a matter of survival due to an existential threat. This expansion
of the security agenda does not challenge the logic of national interest. However, the School
suggests that there might be referent objects for security other than the State.
2.2

Global Crises
Besides the exhaustion of the Cold War, global environmental and economic crises fostered

a worldwide politicization of environmental issues and widened the view of security to themes
beyond militarized geopolitics. In the aftermath of the international oil crisis in the 1970s, an early
view of environmental security tended to highlight the threats caused by shortages of natural
resources.
In 1977, the environmental analyst Lester Brown, in the article "Redefining National
Security," captured this new political moment highlighting that the depletion of resources could
generate political and economic tensions: "Blocking external aggression, may be a relatively
simple matter compared with arresting the deterioration of local ecological systems. The new
threats to national security are extraordinary complex. Ecologists understand that the deteriorating
relationship between four billion humans and, the Earth's biological systems cannot continue. But
few political leaders have yet to grasp the social significance of this' unsustainable situation"
(Brown, 1977, p. 37).
In the post-Cold War scenario, a series of factors and other global threats, such as the
growth of peripheric conflicts, immigration, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, etc., demanded new views
on security that transcended its military aspect (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Trombetta, 2008). It
should also be mentioned that, during the 1980s, major environmental disasters occurred: the gas
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leak at the Union Carbide plant in 1984, the explosion of the nuclear reactor in Chernobyl in 1986,
and spillage of 50 million liters of oil in the Prince Willian Canal, Alaska in 1989, which helped
to bring international attention to cross-border threats provoked by human activities.
Among the global threats, the ozone layer crisis in the 1980s had the most direct implication
to future discussions to tackle climate change. The threat of ozone layer depletion brought attention
to the risks human activities can entail to all ecosystems on Earth, similar to climate change today.
What is more important is that this crisis could be overcome by international diplomacy and
cooperation. Thus, the solutions envisaged for the ozone crisis remain today an inspiration for
climate negotiations.
As a result of the international discussion to solve the issue, the 1989 Montreal Protocol
was the first legally binding environmental treaty. The Protocol aimed at protecting the ozone layer
by eliminating the production and consumption of substances that contributed to its depletion.4
The Montreal Protocol's multilateral relevance resides in allowing immediate action that preceded
the complete scientific understanding of the matter. It was a step in developing the precautionary
principle, which became the cornerstone of International Environmental Law (Benedick, 2021, p.
216). The Montreal Protocol is the only international treaty with universal ratification - the first in
the United Nations history. The massive participation of 197 countries is an indication of global
environmental awareness (Tänzler & Carius, 2012, p. 121). The goals for developed and
developing countries are different, motivated by the principle of shared but differentiated
responsibilities. The established legal regime was effective – the atmospheric concentrations of

4

The document established specific obligations to ensure the progressive reduction in the production and
consumption of ozone depleting substances until complete elimination is achieved. It is structured around seven
groups of halogenated hydrocarbons that contribute to ozone depletion. For each group of these substances, the
Protocol provided a timetable, which establishes an initial "consumption freeze" and pre-defined dates for the
cessation of production and eventual elimination of these substances.
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the main substances that deplete the ozone layer have stabilized or reduced since the Protocol
entered into force. For Benedick (2021, pp. 5-8), the success of the Montreal Protocol is a result
of multiple causes: the role of scientific communities, the power of the public opinion, the
influence of international organizations, national leadership (notably the example from the U.S.
Government), the private sector’s engagement, and the flexibility of the agreement design. It also
should be mentioned that science and industry were able to develop market alternatives to ozonedepleting substances.
The Ozone crisis fostered a global realization that there are threats, such as an
environmental crisis, that are not represented by other States. These threats can only be overcome
by international cooperation. The ozone depletion threat produced one of the first global endeavors
to securitize the environment. International negotiations, under the auspices of the United Nations
and with strong support by the U.S. government, resulted in the 1987 Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Considering that the ozone layer is currently recovering,
Dryzek and Pickering (2019, p. 26) evaluate that "the 1987 Montreal Protocol for protection of the
ozone layer remains the only unambiguously successful collective response to a potentially
catastrophic problem.”
2.3

International Governmental Organizations
International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) or Intergovernmental Organizations are

composed primarily of sovereign States, known as Member States. IGOs play an important role
in preparing and executing programs for climate impact assessment, risk management, and
adaptation. This influence of international organizations on the international debate on
environment and climate change dates to the 1972 UN Stockholm Summit, which was the first
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global conference organized to deal specifically with environmental themes, drawing attention to
the impacts of economic development on the environment (Purvis et al., 2019).
The pioneering role of international organizations is also remarkable in the efforts of climate
securitization. The 1989 U.N Brandt Report highlighted already that the degradation of the
biosphere posed serious threats to humanity's survival (Trombetta, 2008, p. 591). In 1992, the Rio
Earth Summit introduced climate change in international negotiations under the United Nations
auspices. The UNFCCC (or "Climate Convention") was adopted in the Rio Summit, along with
the Convention to Combat Desertification and the Convention on Biodiversity. The other two
global legal instruments concerning climate change, the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Paris
Agreement (2015) were also constructed within the United Nations context.
The views on the role of the IGOs on foreign affairs and security issues can vary according
to the different currents in International Relations. For the currents of thought that sprung from
Classical Realism, the State is the primary actor in international politics. Therefore, other
international actors such as IGOs would have a secondary role. According to Realism, States are
responsible for their survival and have a monopoly of violence, which leads to a situation known
as the "security dilemma.” The "security dilemma" is a vicious circle of mistrust: the efforts of
one State to enhance its security will be perceived by other States as a threat. Therefore, Realism
does not leave much room for cooperation in the foreign field; International Organizations are of
little help in addressing the endless power struggle among States.
Unlike Classical Realism, the Institutionalist School currents argue that States try to
address international and cross-border problems by creating IGOs. The States' interests are not
necessarily antagonistic or harmonious; cooperation through IGOs can subdue the power struggle.
States may have a common interest in obtaining joint gains from collaboration while individual
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States also have incentives to avoid cooperation.

Considering the issues caused by

interdependence and mutual vulnerabilities, even the most powerful States must rely on
cooperation, renouncing self-help strategies (Keohane & Nye Jr, 1973).
The Constructivist Schools differ from Realism and Institutionalist currents. One major
difference is that for Constructivism, the international system anarchy is not inherent to the
structure but socially constructed, and therefore the international system can evolve. The concept
of global governance has emerged from constructivist current, mainly in opposition to international
relations' state-centered theories (Barnett & Duvall, 2004, pp. 1-32). In the context of accelerated
globalization, theories of power and the rational choice seemed insufficient to analyze international
relations' complexity; globalization implies a demand for cooperation.

Constructivism

emphasizes that actors do not only act rationally based on their self-interest (interest orientation)
but also on what is expected of them according to ideals, values and norms in their communities
("norm orientation").
Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, p. 401) contend that international organizations may have a
role "in disseminating new international norms and models of political organization." According
to Barnett and Finnemore (1999), international organizations can influence international relations
by establishing meanings in the social world and articulating and disseminating new principles and
norms. Thus, IGOs would have a dual role: IGOs reflect the values and norms of their foundation
but also influence the development of values and norms and structure the international system.
For Barnett and Finnemore (1999), the influence of international organizations is not
confined to the functions established at their foundation; IGOs develop distinct attributes based on
their expertise or moral authority. For these authors, this authority would be based on a) the
legitimacy of the rational-legal authority, legal procedures, impersonal and rational norms, and b)
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the control over technical knowledge.

Considering the technical knowledge within the

organization, IGOs also can offer an organizational platform for epistemic communities. From this
position, these "norm entrepreneurs" can persuade States to adhere to global norms. Furthermore,
IGOs offer possibilities of discourse and persuasion with negotiations among States, fostering
shifts in the actor's interests. For Barnett and Finnemore (1999), International Organizations are
modern bureaucracies; attributes, also present in other organizations' bureaucracies, can be found
in them. Nevertheless, these authors deny an idealistic view of the effectiveness of IGOs and point
to bureaucracy dysfunctionalities and resistance to change.
2.4

Scientific Communities
The debate on climate change has been inextricably linked to the development of science.

As early as 1896, the Swedish scientist, Svante Arrhenius, hypothesized that an increase in the
atmospheric concentration of CO2 could lead to global warming. In 1938, a British amateur
climatologist, Guy Stewart Callendar, argued before the Royal Meteorological Society that global
warming caused by human activity was underway through greenhouse gas emissions. However,
the idea that an increase in the concentration of CO2 would lead to global warming was not
accepted by the scientific establishment at that time (Fleming, 1998).
The first scientific findings concerning climate change date back to the 19th century, but
the ability to study if humankind influenced the Earth's climate only came about in the second half
of the 20th century. Some scientific developments were necessary to discover anthropogenic
global warming, which was only possible after WWII: an understanding of radiative physics, the
ability to detect trace gases in the atmosphere, the ability to measure climate variables, and
computing power to process climate information.
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In the post WWII, the development of aviation demanded the expansion of the knowledge
about the oceans and the skies. Furthermore, nuclear weapons became more complex and required
more sophisticated computing power to simulate the effects of different weapon designs. The
development of nuclear weapons also fostered new technologies to detect trace gasses in the
atmosphere; identifying radioactive material from atomic fallout became essential to detect nuclear
tests. New technologies originally developed for defense purposes could be used to track carbon
emissions, indicating, for the first time, the presence in the atmosphere of carbon dioxide
originated from the burning of fossil fuels. Furthermore, improved computer systems allowed
scientists to analyze all the new climate data and conclude that human carbon emissions had
warmed the planet (Weart, 2008).
In this context, the 1957 article published by the University of California researchers Roger
Revelle and Hans Suess is often regarded as the starting point for the academic debate about
climate change due to anthropogenic factors. The two authors estimated that the ocean would be
less capable of absorbing the CO2 emitted into the atmosphere than thought until then and
highlighted the risks of climate change due to emissions. Later, Charles Keeling set up a CO2
measurement laboratory on the slopes of Mauna Loa and, in 1961, could confirm that an increase
in atmospheric CO2 was happening (Fleming, 1998, p. 3).
As a result of these developments, since the 1960s, a circle of scientists could affirm that
an increase of CO2 in the atmosphere was taking place. Still, there were not enough data to
evaluate the risks represented by the higher concentrations of greenhouse gases. More developed
climate models were soon available and made possible a better evaluation. In 1979, a report to the
American Academy of Sciences, coordinated by Professor Jules Charney, indicated a possibility
of a temperature increase of 1.5 to 4.5 ° C if the amount of CO2 doubles in the atmosphere. When
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the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) conveyed in 1979 the First World Climate
Conference, there was enough evidence on climate change that justified the proposal for the
establishment of the World Climate Program. This international research program was eventually
created in 1980 within the WMO and, with the involvement of other organizations, provided the
foundations for the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on climate change (IPCC), created in 1988
(Zillman, 2009, p. 145).
Despite the evolution of scientific knowledge regarding climate change, the influence of
this knowledge on political discourses and decision-making is not automatic. Scientists grouped
in various networks and associations have played a fundamental role in structuring international
environmental governance since the 1970s by their influence on the political agendas (Meyer et
al., 1997). Haas (1992, p. 3) introduced the notion of "epistemic communities": "a network of
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within a domain or issue area." Epistemic
communities are often organized in transnational networks of like-minded actors supporting an
idea or policy which do not necessarily reflect States' interests. The members of an epistemic
community should share causal beliefs, normative principles, and a political project; they not only
create but justify knowledge. They may hold different functions, be within various organizations,
be located in several countries, and jointly exert influence over several governments.
For Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, epistemic communities function as "norm entrepreneurs,"
seeking to persuade States to agree and to adhere to specific norms. The epistemic communities
can influence political decisions by highlighting a particular issue and drawing State leaders'
attention to a specific theme. Scientists and experts are recognized as privileged holders of
knowledge, which gives them an intellectual authority to promote their ideas to political leaders.
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This position allows them to feed governments with information and construct the framework
through which the information is interpreted.
Epistemic communities sometimes exert a strong influence on international negotiations.
For Haas, the global networking of scientists in the environment started by convincing the Reagan
Administration to implement strict regulations on CFC emissions. Haas envisages the ozone
negotiations, which led to the 1987 Montreal Protocol, as evidence that some international
environmental regimes are initiated thanks to the contribution of scientific knowledge by epistemic
communities. Today, the IPCC is considered the most influential epistemic community on climate
change.
The influence of the epistemic communities depends on the ideological predisposition of
public decision-makers to accept the ideas (Haas, 1992). Furthermore, other factors can amplify
the capacity of an epistemic community to present an issue to the political agenda, such as the
alliance with a coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a high degree of uncertainty,
a context of crisis, and low political opposition (Gough & Shackley, 2001).
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UNITED STATES: SPECIFIC TRENDS IN THE CLIMATE DEBATE

The politicization of the environment in the United States has its origin in the 1960s wave
of social contestation, which also fueled other movements in the country, such as the Civil Rights
movement (Howison, 2018). Environmentalism had become a major concern for the U.S. civil
society in the 1960s; air pollution, oil spills, and other signs of environmental degradation were
visible for most citizens. On April 22, 1970, Earth Day mobilized millions of Americans, which
is usually considered the beginning of environmentalism as a social and political movement in the
United States. In the 1970s, despite politicization, there was relative consensus between Democrats
and Republicans concerning environmental politics. This bipartisan support fostered significant
progress in the environmental legislation during the Nixon Administration, 1969-1974 (Dunlap &
Mertig, 2014).
Much of the framework for environmental and conservationist policies that are still
relevant in the United States today was designed by the Republican party with a bipartisan support.
In the context of the Vietnam war, the environment was seen as a unifying issue. Republicans took
the lead as Nixon pulled out environmentalism from the counterculture spirit (Dryzek & Pickering,
2019). During Nixon Presidency, environmental regulation was moved up to the federal level as a
sign of priority. The laws were passed on a bipartisan basis with the overwhelming support of both
parties.
In 1968, President Nixon created the Task Force on Environment. The initiative of the
Republican Administration led to the congressional approval of one of the first laws that
established a national framework for environmental protection, the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969. The purpose of the Act was, and is to this day, to certify that the government conducts
assessments before it begins federal projects that may affect the environment. The Nixon
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Administration, with the help of a Democratic Congress, passed many environmental initiatives,
from institutional reforms to pollution control. On January 1, 1970, President Nixon signed the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), creating the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), a body of special environmental advisers to the President and initiated an organizational
restructuring which gave origin to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The
institutionalization of environmentalism was complemented by important legislation: the 1970
Clean Air Act, in order to tackle air pollution and set standards for what type of pollutants can be
released. In 1972, President Nixon signed the Clean Water Act to regulate water quality. The Act
also made it illegal to discharge pollutants into navigable waters. In 1973, the Nixon government
approved The Endangered Species Act, which granted government powers to protect species at
risk of extinction (Dunlap et al., 2001).
After an initial period of relative consensus between Democrats and Republicans in the
early 1970s, the ideological divide between conservatives and liberals concerning environmental
politics deepened. This ideological and partisan divide became a particular feature of the political
debate in the country that should not be ignored when U.S. political speeches and policies on the
environment, and particularly climate change, are analyzed.

Authors highlight that party

polarization is not limited to themes related to the environment but much broader, affecting many
different areas, such as immigration, health, and reproductive rights. The ideological divide is more
easily perceived in climate change than in other themes in the environmental area (Sinclair, 2006).
Multiple studies have shown a strong correlation between political affiliation and
individual views on climate change. Dunlap et al. (2016) analyzed the disparity of views between
Democrats and Republicans regarding climate change. Republicans' disbelief about global
warming was evident, especially during the economic crisis: in 2010, 71% of Democrats and 29%
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of the Republicans believed in climate change. In 2016, these numbers were 75% for Democrats
and 41% for Republicans. Moreover, the study points out that, in 2016, 84% of Democrats and
43% of Republicans believed in the influence of man in climate change. The authors contend that
this divide stems from the conservative aversion to government regulatory measures, combined
with substantial campaign donations from the fossil fuel lobby to conservative politicians. The
tendency to selectively reject information that confronts beliefs and identities would be an
important reason why scientific data does not modify opinions on climate change. The research
conducted indicated that partisan differences are stronger with higher education among individuals
who believe they understand climate change reasonably well than among those who believe they
understand poorly.
On the other hand, concerning liberals, authors have lighted a deeper ecological concern
than conservatives and that the deeper criticism against environmentalism tends to come from
conservatives. Liberals tend to be more concerned about the environment, recognizing the
anthropogenic origin of climate change and its risks for humanity. For Currie and Choma (2018),
the green behavior for many liberals often assumes characteristics of a moral imperative.
Horwitz (2013) can trace this partisan divide back to the 1980s, when the Reagan
Administration influenced conservative opinions on many themes, including the environment. The
conservative view on environmentalism became more defined. The Reagan Administration,
guided by a free-market ideology, was hostile to government regulation and, by extension,
opponent to environmental protection through regulation.

Republican party leaders began

championing a deregulatory mindset; according to free-market conservatives, environmental
regulation was placing unnecessary burdens on business. Instead of reforming the environmental
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regulation approved in the 1970s, the Reagan Administration tried to reverse it but without success
(Dunlap et al., 2001; Hochschild, 2018).
Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez (2016) can trace the beginning of the ideological divide to
the aftermath of the civil rights movement, which led to a concentration of more conservative
views in the Republican and liberal ideas in the Democratic Party. However, this initial divide
cannot explain the more recent polarization. The authors indicate that since the 1960s, there has
been an "asymmetric polarization" - the Republican Party continued to move further to the right
than the Democratic Party. This movement contradicts the "median voter theorem" as the
Republican Party did not move back to the middle of public opinion. The authors suggest an
"organizational approach" to explain the partisan divide: the move to the right in the Republican
party cannot be defined only by the position of the electoral base. There is a correlation between
certain Republican representatives' positions and the action of donor groups, advocacy groups,
think tanks, and constituency organizations. This correlation would explain a gap between the
position of Republican officeholders and the average Republican voter in themes such as social
benefits, social security, public spending, and climate change. Concerning climate politics, for
instance, the authors found the correlation between the action of the anti-climate tax group
"Americans for Prosperity" and the position of Republican representatives increasingly against
climate tax in the period 2009-2014 (p. 693). This tendency was contrary to most constituencies
of the Republican party, which were increasingly favorable to measures to control GHC emission
in the same period.
Likewise, Hoffman (2012) contends that the partisan divide on climate change has been
promoted by sectorial interests: "following in the wake of the 1997 Kyoto Treaty that threatened
the material interests of powerful economic and political interests, particularly members of the
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fossil-fuel industry." The Kyoto Protocol meant that an issue that was debated primarily in
scientific circles became relevant to the point of impacting powerful economic interests.
Dunlap and Jacques (2013) contend that polarization increased as conservative thinktanks
and corporations started to become more involved in the organization of climate denial:
"manufacturing uncertainties." For these authors, in the 1990s, in part as a reaction to the growing
globalization of the environmental regulations stimulated by the 1992 Rio Summit, conservative
thinktanks launched an anti-environmental movement. The tactic was doubting climate science to
delegitimize the claims of environmental policymakers, especially through the media.
Hoffman (2012) accepts the influence of economic interests on climate change policies but
argues that this influence is consolidated by cultural and identity aspects: "climate change has
become enmeshed in the so-called culture wars." For this author, climate denialism is not a matter
of access to scientific knowledge but an expression of political identity that leads to the disregard
of scientific data, as in other social issues such as gun ownership, same-sex marriage, etc. The
difference of views between Democrats or Republicans concerning climate change is a cultural
issue; opinions regarding climate change are based on ideological preferences, personal
experiences, and values, influenced by reference groups. The author also suggests that the culture
war on climate change is part of a broader cultural/religious/political conflicts that generate debates
between conservatives and liberals on abortion, weapons, health system, evolution, etc. These
groups see climate change through different "cognitive filters" and interpret and validate the
information from the scientific community by their own pre-existing beliefs. The "cognitive
filters" show cultural identification with the group - cultural identity can overpower scientific
reasoning.
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Other authors contend that some conservatives tend to react against environmentalism
because they associate the movement with socialism or with anti-establishment positions
(Howison, 2018; Pilbeam, 2003). Furthermore, conservatism in the United States is often
associated with the nationalistic sentiment, critical of international organizations and international
commitments in general, including in the environment (Pilbeam, 2003). As discussed,
environmental organizations have a paramount role in the environmental securitization moves at
a global level.
In the post-Cold War era, partisan polarization and divergence of views on environmental
security have substantially impacted the United States' environmental agendas. At the domestic
level, polarization is intense in Congress, where a Republican majority produces severe obstacles
to legislate for environmental protection (Dunlap et al., 2016). In foreign policy, the divergence
of views on environmental security has resulted in the discontinuity of U.S speeches and
international positions: the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol5 under the Clinton Administration
(1997), abandoned by the Bush Administration (2001); President Obama's pledges in Copenhagen
(2009), rejected the following year by the conservative majority Congress; the signature of the

5

The Kyoto Protocol was not ratified due to the Republican opposition of the United States Congress (Bodansky,
2016). In 1997, Republican Senators issued the Byrd-Hagel resolution blocking the Kyoto Protocol ratification. The
resolution was contrary to any agreement differentiating between commitments for the United States and other
countries. For the Republican opposition, the commitment to carbon reductions would affect American
competitiveness with emerging economies. To add to the difficulty, several Senators brought sovereigntist
arguments (Milkoreit, 2019, p. 1024). The negotiations for implementing the Kyoto Protocol took seven years
(1998-2005). The Parties extended the Protocol's deadline from 2012 to 2020 and started negotiations for the next
period of commitments. During the new round of negotiations, developed countries tried to convince emerging
economies to make specific commitments to mitigate climate change.
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Paris Agreement in 20166, denounced by Donald Trump; the return to the Paris Agreement by Joe
Biden (2021).

7

6

On December 12, 2015, the Paris Agreement was approved by 195 states. The Paris Agreement complements the
International Climate Change Regime's three-dimensional structure, composed of the Climate Convention, the
Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. The Agreement was the first that established a universal target to limit
global warming but based on voluntary commitments (pledge and review system), without the institutional
framework to guarantee its implementation, (Dryzek & Pickering, 2019). The Paris Agreement seeks an
intermediary solution that is neither too demanding, and therefore unacceptable for most governments, nor too weak,
and consequently ineffective. The nationally determined contributions (bottom-up approach) complement
international standards to encourage States to increase their efforts progressively (Bodansky, 2016).
7

Robert Putnam's (1988) two-level game theory is useful to describe the dynamics of climate negotiations. Putnam's
theory highlight that States engage in negotiations at the international level and at the domestic level, sometimes
simultaneously. A country's position at the foreign level is the result of domestic political competition between
various actors that attempt to shape a foreign policy favorable to their interests. Domestic actors may also have a
role in approving an agreement reached at the international level in the phases of ratification or implementation. The
two-level game theory may help understand why the U.S. has signed the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris agreement but
has failed to ratify them. These agreements could be successfully negotiated internationally but did not overlap
domestic demands and thus could not be approved by the U.S. Senate as a result. International negotiations fail
when outcomes preferred by domestic constituencies cannot be attainable in foreign negotiations, or outcomes
preferred by other countries may not be acceptable to domestic constituencies. The challenge of finding results that
satisfy both international partners and domestic interests can be a barrier to successfully concluding an international
agreement. In the case of the United States, the challenge to conciliate the domestic and foreign levels is increased
due to intense politization and different views, sometimes opposing views, of the two major political parties
concerning environmental security, notably climate change.
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4

THE CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW ON ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

Constructivism has drawn on philosophers like Emmanuel Kant or sociologists like Emile
Durkheim. Durkheim inspired Constructivism on several levels; he developed a concept of social
facts, highlighting the importance of shared beliefs and feelings (the "collective consciousness").
Constructivism is a priori antiessentialist: States' behavior and their identities and interests change
because they are determined by beliefs and representations, which can change through social
interactions.
If Realism argues the structural anarchy of the international system makes power essential
in international relations, Constructivism claims that ideas are the primary driver of international
politics. For Wendt (1992, p. 395): "anarchy is what States make of it." Thus, for Constructivism,
anarchy is constructed; it depends on the States' behaviors. The States' behaviors are based on
their culture, their national identity, and how their societies are shaped. According to Finnemore
and Sikkink (2001, p. 393), contrary to Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches, which focus on the
results of the actors' behavior, Constructivism contends that the actors' (countries, societies,
individuals) conscience develops together with the structures they create. For Constructivism,
human interaction is primarily determined by ideational factors, not material ones, which build
identities and interests. Constructivism acknowledges that material factors matter, but they are
interwoven and interdependent of ideational factors. Beliefs play a fundamental role in building
reality; an environmental threat is a physical reality, but at the same time, a social construction.
The primary forum for the constructivist views on environmental security is the
Copenhagen School. Few authors outside School use constructivist analytical tools to analyze
environmental security. In Denmark, the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) was
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organized in 1985. The Institute was formed by two chief researchers, Barry Buzan and Ole
Waever, and later Jaap Wilde and Lane Hansen. From the beginning, COPRI was critical of the
Realist Theory, denying that the State and its military issues were the only focus of security issues
(Buzan & Hansen, 2009).
The School's foundational work, "Security: A new framework for analysis," was published
in 1998 by Buzan, Weaver, and Wilde. The authors did not intend a break from traditional security
studies but broadened the field of study beyond the military sector. For the Copenhagen School,
securitization involves constructing ontological threats in the discourse following what Barry
Buzan calls a "grammar of security." For the School, discourses contribute to creating new
practices and rules. The construction of threats occurs, fundamentally, through speeches by the
actors interested in establishing security agendas, raising an issue to the level of threat to national
or international security. Political authority can define an ontological threat with enough salience
to have substantial political effects. An issue becomes a security concern when it is articulated as
such and, as society starts to approach an issue through the prism of security, its behavior changes.
In international relations, securitization causes a change in the nations' behavior concerning the
securitized issue.
The securitization framework involves a spectrum. On the one hand, nonpoliticized issues
are not considered political matters; they are not included in the public debate but belong to the
private domain. There are those politicized issues, which are a matter of public policy and are part
of the standard political system, but they are not presented as existential threat. At the other end of
the spectrum, securitized issues are not just considered a matter of public policy but are given
special priority status.
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Securitization happens when an issue is presented to an audience as an existential threat,
requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the procedures of normal politics.
Thus, securitizing an issue result in the radicalization of the range of possible policies that the
securitizing actor can enact in the name of this political problem. As soon as a theme becomes a
security concern, the choice of possible measures becomes larger. Since the security discourse
carries a sense of urgency, priority, alarm, and crisis, actors can take extraordinary means in its
name. According to Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 23-24), securitization is an extreme version of
politicization. Desecuritization means that the issue returns to the politicization stage.
For Buzan et al. (1998), the discourse is the beginning of the process of securitization.
Security is seen as an essentially intersubjective process, not an objective state of affairs, but a
discursive construction of a specific issue. Thus, the most appropriate way to study securitization
would be "to study discourses and political constellations" (p. 25). Security equals, therefore,
enclosing the address in a logic of "threat/defense" requiring increased intervention. Securitization
only occurs when there is acceptance of this speech and a recognition of an ontological threat by
the audience. An audience must agree collectively on the threat's nature and support extraordinary
measures for securitization.
Buzan et al. (1998, p. 25) state that: "the existential threat has to be argued and just gain
enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency
measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of
existential threats, point of no return, and necessity." Thus, the evolution of the theme from one
stage to another (nonpoliticization, politicization, or securitization) will depend on the capacity of
the securitizing agent to convince a specific audience.
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Though the success of securitization involves the combination of intrinsic characteristics
of the discourse, the social conditions capable of favoring the acceptance by the audience of the
existential threat should not be disregarded. Thus, in the case of climate securitization, the
expansion of the scientific information on the problem has helped to give visibility to it and
contributed to its politicization and securitization.
For Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 36-40), security involves three types of units: a) The referent
objects, which are threatened and need to be protected. The range of possible referent objects in
the environmental sector is wide: biodiversity, threatened species, habitats, water resources, or
large-scale themes such as climate or ozone. b) The securitizing actors declare the threats, having
the institutional power to politicize and move the issue. Securitizing actors are, for example,
international organizations, governments, politicians. c) Functional actors significantly influence
the security field but are not securitizing actors, for example, the media, academia, NGOs, and
think tanks (Buzan et al., 1998).
A securitizing actor presents a securitizing speech act by declaring a reference object under
an existential threat, defining the political agenda of security, which is fundamentally
governmental and intergovernmental. The securitizing actors determine the public policies that
indicate how the environmental threat will be treated (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 72). The scientific
agenda is constructed by "functional actors" and addresses scientific and nongovernmental
activities involving scientists and research institutions responsible for listing the most diverse
environmental problems as referent objects. Indeed, epistemic communities have a significant
influence on the process of climate securitization. Science is the ultimate refuge of political
legitimacy, notably in complex environmental issues such as the climate (Buzan et al., 1998, p.
77).
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Concerning the notion of security, the Copenhagen School does not deviate very far from
a traditional understanding. However, the School suggests that there might be referent objects for
security other than the State. Buzan et al. (1998) presented a multisectoral approach to security in
five sectors: (1) the military sector is associated with the use of force and coercion by military
agents. The military sector is the realm of traditional security studies; (2) the political sector
involves the threats to the organizational stability of the State, organizations, regime types,
ideologies; (3) the societal sector is related to collective identities in society – the survival of a
language, culture, identity, values, "way of life";(4) the economic sector involves threats related
to in the economic order, resource and fiscal stability, threat of poverty and starvation; (5) the
environmental, concerning the relationships between human activities and the biosphere,
ecological balance and preventable natural and health disasters. These sectors have specific
referent objects conducive to securitization.
Societal security concerns the stability of interactions between individuals and social
groups. While security means a defense of its sovereignty for the State, it means the defense of its
identity for society. In society, individuals can feel threatened, for instance, by economic crises,
immigration, some form of foreign cultural influence, etc., which do not necessarily impact the
State's sovereignty (McSweeney, 1996). In societal security, the Copenhagen School provides a
distinction between the State and the population. The concept also highlights that the coherence
of a society can be threatened by threats other than violence and coercion.
The Copenhagen School distinguishes environmental threats into three groups: a) natural
factors not related to human activities (such as natural catastrophes); b) human actions that affect
natural systems to the level of posing an ontological threat to humanity - the most evident example
is emissions of gases such as the GHGs or the CFCs; c) human actions in the natural systems that
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do not seem to pose an ontological threat to civilization. Only the threats illustrated in the second
point (b) are considered within the range of environmental security.
The Copenhagen School raised the possibility that systemic issues could unite human
communities before a common threat (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 11-15). These authors recognize an
opportunity to transcend the antagonism linked to securitizations when actors join to counter a
common threat that goes beyond them. In these conditions, antagonisms and rivalries would give
way to cooperation (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 199). The School, however, downplayed the likelihood
that a threat perceived as global would receive enough attention to generate a feeling of universal
vulnerability (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 82-83).
Buzan and Waever (2009) more recently returned to this discussion by specifying the
conditions relating to these systemic securitizations (which they call macrosecuritization).
Macrosecurizations would still be rare but not entirely impossible when motivated by universal
claims such as ideology, religion, or the environment (Buzan & Waever, 2009, pp. 257-261).
According to Buzan and Waever, only environmental issues have the potential to reach a universal
level of securitization. The possibility of the climate threat for macrosecuritization derives from
its nature, as presented by the scientific consensus. The environmental threat is not represented by
other States, nations, cultures, religions, etc. The danger is a priori external to human relations and
social life. Thus, as the climate change threat is global and diffuse, its characteristics are conducive
to systemic and universal securitizations.
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METHODOLOGY: SPEECH ANALYSIS

The research question that motivated this project was formulated as follows: "How climate
security has evolved in high-level United States political speeches?" I hypothesize that climate
change securitization has progressed in U.S. high-level security speeches in the post-Cold War
period. Verifying this hypothesis involves: a) identifying climate securitization in top-level U.S
speeches in the post-Cold War, according to the criteria established by the Copenhagen School, b)
contextualizing the discourses with a review of climate change policies by the U.S.
Administrations in the historical period concerned; c) comparing the results of the speech analysis
and the review of policies.
Speech analysis will be based on the National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement (NSS), and other documents when necessary, such as State of the Union addresses,
by Post-Cold War U.S. governments, namely Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama,
Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. The primary audience of the National Security Strategy of
Engagement and Enlargement is the U.S Congress, the same as in the case of State of the Union
Addresses. The speeches were chosen as they represent national security concerns and future
policy proposals with a targeted audience, reflecting each Administration's beliefs and values in
the historical moment they were elaborated.
The Copenhagen School establishes a body of criteria for identifying securitizations in
speeches, a methodology inseparable from its theoretical thinking. Securitization is identified with
the presence of a particular narrative structure where four fundamental elements are associated:
(a) a securitizing actor that informs a (b) relevant audience about a threat to (c) a referent object
and that (d) extraordinary measures should be taken to overcome this threat (Buzan et al., 1998,
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pp. 23-25). In this discourse, the word "security" does not need to be evoked, but its resonance
must be at least implicit (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 176).
Besides the speech structure, an effective securitization demands a relevant securitizing
agent and the acceptance by the audience of exceptional measures. An effective securitization
should convince a relevant audience of the imminence of an ontological threat; the dynamics of
urgency must be accepted (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23-25). When a securitizing attempt does not
fully meet these conditions, there is a "securitizing move" (in the words of the Copenhagen
School).
Buzan et al. (1998, p. 74) highlight that securitizing attempts in the environmental sector
often fail: "The environmental sector displays more clearly than any other the propensity for
dramatic securitizing moves but with comparatively little successful securitization effects (i.e.,
those that lead to extraordinary measures)." Securitizing moves are not necessarily insignificant
because they bring attention and solutions for specific issues in the political agenda and can pave
the way for future securitization (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 57).
Researchers have studied the different security representations of environmental
degradation and climate change through the speeches of political actors.

Barnett (2003)

highlighted a duality in the security representation of environmental issues by actors: some
discourses focus on the risks of conflicts arising from ecological problems; others on the dangers
these problems pose to the development and survival of humankind. Barnett criticizes a tendency
to the militarized representation of the climate threat in speeches; thinking about this type of
problem through traditional security schemes would be unproductive: "understanding climate
change as a security issue risk making it a military rather than a foreign policy problem, and a
sovereignty rather than a global common problem. This may help justify further securing of the

33
unsustainable livelihoods of the North in the way of George Bush Snr at the United Nations
Conference on Development in 1992, and George W Bush over the Kyoto Protocol" (Barnett,
2003, p. 10).
Detraz and Betsill (2009) analyzed speeches and official reports presenting climate change
as a threat to national, regional, or international security. These authors highlight that the threat
representation varies according to the speaker, somewhat reflecting the broad interpretive power
of actors in this regard. However, if the authors evoke examples where climate change is associated
with a risk of conflicts, this would not be the dominant view. In most speeches, the threat would
concentrate on the overall impact on human communities' well-being.
Some elements of the speech distinguish climate securitization from traditional
securitization and indicate normative innovation compared to traditional security speeches. In the
case of climate change, the exceptional measures do not target any specific enemy. For Buzan
and Waever (2009), climate securitization is conducive to macrosecuritization, and thus, is often
associated with normative innovations in speeches. In macrosecuritization, the referent object
would have a universal character (the planet, the humanity). Rather than being defined as a precise
enemy, the designated threat would be presented as diffuse, intangible, or seen as a collective
responsibility. The exceptional measures imply a departure from "politics as usual"; however,
deployed in a context of global security not targeting any specific enemy. Macrosecuritizations
foster international cooperation and the erosion of particularism.
On the other hand, the traditional security is state-centric: the referent object is specific
(usually, a State, group of States). A particular object makes systemic and universal securitizations
improbable. Moreover, the nature of the designated threat is intrinsic to human relations, caused
by a specific enemy ("alien other"), usually a State or a group of States considered responsible for
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the insecurity that weighs on the referent object. The exceptional measures tend to resort to the
conventional security apparatus and involve coercion. Classical securitization involves urgency,
antagonism, identity tension, and a zero-sum game in terms of dynamics (Buzan et al., 1998).
The criteria discussed above help with a preliminary identification of climate security
elements in a text. Nevertheless, ambiguities can remain in speech analysis. It is often unfeasible
to quantify the significance of speeches, their acceptance, and their specific contribution to moving
the security agenda. Likewise, exceptional measures are not precisely defined by the School’s
framework and depend mainly on the context. Thus, the effort to contextualize the speeches by a
review of each Administration’s policies had the objective of better assessing the speeches'
significance and scope.
Concerning the notion of exceptional measure, a priori, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 24) refer to
a break with the legal framework or the pattern of resource allocation for a specific action. In
speeches, it remains challenging to distinguish between measures that fall into the category of
"politics as usual" from those considered "exceptional." Overall, in the case of climate change,
exceptional (or extraordinary) measures fall into two categories: mitigation and adaptation.
Mitigation measures aim to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. Adaptation measures aim
to decrease the vulnerability of natural and human systems against the effects (present and
expected) of climate change.
In this thesis analysis, plans, at the domestic level, to promote and allocate resources to
efficient transportation systems, alternative energy sources, clean energy transformation,
suspension of actions that could lead to increased emissions, such as the construction of pipelines
or drilling, the establishment of stricter emissions regulations, etc. will be considered examples of
mitigation actions. Investments to build or renew infrastructure more resilient to climate change
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would fall into the adaptation category. At the international level, participation in global efforts,
such as international agreements that restrict national emissions, will be considered extraordinary
measures in mitigation. Furthermore, global cooperation initiatives for mitigation or adaptation,
such as funding climate change actions in developing countries, are exceptional measures that also
indicate a break with antagonisms that characterize traditional security views.
This thesis epistemological approach remains more interpretative than positivist. The
socially constructed and intersubjective aspect of security is highlighted by choosing the
Copenhagen School framework to analyze the relationship between climate and security.
Environmental threats (notably climate change) are tangible but are often projections based on
scientific research. Therefore, the constructivist framework is interesting since the climate threats
that motivate securitization are designated threats based on scientific information. Climate threats
have not reached their full potential; nonetheless, they encourage exceptional security measures at
present.
Ultimately, this project does not aim at establishing a matrix of the evolution of climate
securitization in terms of percentage of change or continuity or in terms of acceptance. The
objective is humbler and essentially theoretical: to demonstrate that climate change contributes to
a conceptual renewal in the U.S. security discourses and policies, security is understood here as
mental representation and a political process. A literature review can give relevant elements about
the overall acceptance or rejection of the securitizing moves proposed by the U.S Administrations
that will be analyzed.
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ANALYSING UNITED STATES’ DISCOURSES

The elaboration of the most important official document that states U.S. foreign and
security, the National Security Strategy (NSS), is based on the U.S. system's constitutional division
of power, originating from the efforts of multiple institutions. The NSS is far from a politically
neutral document (Snider & Nagl, 1995). The NSS elaboration leads to an interactive and
interinstitutional process requiring high-level meetings that help conciliate government views and
help create internal consensus on policies, allowing the Administration to speak with unity. The
NSS aims at informing the President's positions to Congress, legitimizing its demands for
resources; thus, its primary audience is the U.S. Congress. Nevertheless, it is impossible to assess
its ultimate audience, scope, and impact as the NSS is a public document available online. The
NSS also communicates with individual citizens, academics, the media, multiple groups, and the
electorate seeking presidential recognition of their demands, and these groups, in the end, can
influence the congressmen's views on the issue.

6.1

The Bill Clinton Administration (1993 – 2001)
In the post-Cold War, international relations developments helped broaden the

international security agenda to cover other themes such as the environment. A new world order
emerged. The inexistence of major military threats to the U.S allowed the emergence of "soft
power" issues. Moreover, these new issues could receive resources that originated from reducing
the country's budget for military defense.
The first Administration after the Cold War, the election of Democratic President Bill
Clinton and his environmentally friendly Vice-president Albert "Al" Gore, represented an
expansion of environmental security compared with previous Administrations. The end of the Cold
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War implied that the country did not fear any significant military threat. Greater attention started
to be given to the environmental and other soft power agendas, followed by reducing the country's
defense budget.
During his two mandates, the Clinton Administration issued seven National Security
Strategy Reports in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. In the National Security
Strategy Reports, the term "environment" (in the sense of ecology) was mentioned 47 times in
1994, 54 in 1995, 59 in 1996, 57 in 1997, 80 in 1998, 63 in 1999, 64 in 2000. Climate Change was
mentioned twice in 1994, twice in 1995, four times in 1996, four times in 1997 NSS, six times in
1998 NSS, once in 1999 NSS, once in 2000 NSS. The term "environmental security" was
mentioned in all National Security Reports but in 1997.
In the NSSs released in both Clinton Administrations, climate change was treated as a
security issue when it was mentioned according to the criteria established by the Copenhagen
School. For instance, the 1994 NSS highlights that the United States and ultimately humanity as
the referent objects threatened by climate change. Climate change is included on a list of
environmental threats: "Chernobyl or the East African drought, and to largescale ecosystem
damage caused by industrial pollution, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, ozone depletion, and
ultimately climate change" (Clinton, 1994a, p. 15). In Bill Clinton's speeches, climate change is
often treated in a list of other environmental security issues as the climate change had still not
reached the preeminence in political discourses that it has today.
The exceptional measure to confront climate change as an existential threat is established,
the reduction of GHG emissions: "We have committed the United States to reduce its greenhouse
gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, and we have developed a National Climate Plan to
achieve that goal" (Clinton, 1994a, p. 3). The universal character of climate change as the
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designated threat, the referent objects (ultimately the whole planet) justify the call for international
cooperation and solidarity, breaking with oppositions that usually characterizes traditional
securitization:: "Strategies dealing with environmental issues of this magnitude will require
partnerships between governments and nongovernmental organizations, cooperation between
nations and regions, and a commitment to a strategically focused, long-term policy for emerging
environmental risks" (Clinton, 1994a, p. 15). 8
The same narrative structure can be identified in the 1999 National Security Strategy. The
Report designates climate change as a threat in a list of other environmental threats:
"Environmental threats such as climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, introduction of
nuisance plant and animal species, overharvesting of fish, forests and other living natural
resources, and the transnational movement of hazardous chemicals and waste directly threaten the
health and economic well-being of U.S. citizens" (Clinton, 1999a, p. 13). Like other environmental
threats listed, climate change is presented as a potential to harm the referent objects: the United
States and the well-being of its citizens. The exceptional measure to counter climate threat is
emissions reduction based on the Kyoto Protocol commitments. Furthermore, the discourse
highlights the importance of diplomacy and cooperation to react to climate threats and alludes to
common but differentiated responsibilities, indicating that key emerging economies should
participate in the efforts: "We will not submit the Kyoto agreement for ratification until key

8

In the National Security Strategies, the Bill Clinton Administration often mentions international cooperation
through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) in climate change or the environment in general. The Global
Environment Facility (GEF) is an organization created in 1991, before the 1992 Earth Summit, which operates a
fund intended to carry out actions to preserve the environment. It is an independent financial organization that grants
subsidies to projects related to biodiversity, the fight against the effects of global warming, water pollution, soil
regression and degradation, reduction of the ozone layer and pollutants, etc. The GEF works in partnership with
international institutions, non-governmental organizations, and private sector partners, addressing environmental
issues on a global scale. Today, the GEF is the world's largest fund for environmental projects.
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developing nations have agreed to participate meaningfully in efforts to address global warming"
(Clinton, 1999a, p. 13).
Other documents of the Clinton Administration inform the climate securitization narratives
following the Copenhagen School criteria. During the Clinton Administration, "environment" or
"climate change" were mentioned in all State of the Union Addresses, except for the 1995 State of
the Union Address. The speaker adjusts his rhetoric to the audience. The political reason why the
words "environment" or "climate" is not mentioned in the 9,190 words of the 1995 State of the
Union address can be explained by the fact that since 1954 this was the first discourse to a
Republican majority Congress and the first time with a Republican Speaker. This State of the
Union Address was particularly conservative to seek support from the Republican majority;
mentioning environmental issues was certainly not one of the themes in this strategy to gather
support from conservatives. 9
In 1998, for the first time during the Clinton Administration, a State of the Union Address
brought climate change as an issue: "Our overriding environmental challenge tonight is the
worldwide problem of climate change, global warming, the gathering crisis that requires
worldwide action. The vast majority of scientists have concluded unequivocally that if we don't
reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, at some point in the next century, we'll disrupt our
climate and put our children and grandchildren at risk. This past December, America led the world
to reach a historic agreement committing our Nation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through
market forces, new technologies, energy efficiency. We have it in our power to act right here, right

9

Devroy, A (1995). Clinton Calls for a Centrist' Social Compact. Washington Post. January 25, 1995.
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now. I propose $6 billion in tax cuts and research and development to encourage innovation,
renewable energy, fuel-efficient cars, energy-efficient homes" (Clinton, 1998a).
The narrative structure in the 1998 State of the Union Address indicates a securitization
move. First, the discourse establishes the centrality of the designated threat, climate change. The
disruption of the climate is an overwhelming problem that justifies securitization. Climate change
is defined as the country's primary environmental challenge but also as a universal problem. The
designation of climate change as an existential threat to the referent object "the future our children
and grandchildren” reinforces the gravity and the urgent character of the matter. Furthermore, the
exceptional measures (to reduce GHG emissions) are associated with a specific resource
allocation.
In the 1999 State of the Union Address, in the securitization move, the association of future
generations with climate change is reiterated, like in other Bill Clinton speeches. This association
is not trivial: the allusion to intergenerationally would run against short-term political rationality,
a rhetorical strategy to push for a break with "politics as usual": "But our most fateful new
challenge is the threat of global warming; 1998 was the warmest year ever recorded. Last year's
heat waves, floods, and storms are but a hint of what future generations may endure if we do not
act now."
Actions by the Clinton Administration also corroborate the idea of progress in
environmental and climate security. From the beginning of his mandate, President Clinton sought
to implement climate policies to reduce GHG emissions. The "Climate Change Action Plan" was
presented in April 1993 to stabilize emissions for the year 2000. However, the 52 voluntary
initiatives encompassed by the "Climate Change Action Plan" found objection in Congress,
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particularly the tax on fuel. Changes in the plan in Congress made the tax too low to have a
significant impact on fuel consumption (Hahn et al., 2002).
The Clinton Administration created the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Environmental Security (ODUSD-ES) and defined "environmental security." For the first time,
the term "environmental security" became part of the official name of an administrative branch,
though most of the programs run by the ODUSD-ES were not new. Sherri Wasserman Goodman
was designated as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security, remaining in
this position during the Clinton Administration (Floyd, 2010, pp. 87-90).
During the Clinton Administration, as a convergence of traditional national security and
environmental protection, "environmental security" was defined by the DOD as follows:
"Environmental security threats are conditions affecting human health, safety, or environment that
impair DOD's ability to prepare for or carry out the National Security Strategy or create instabilities
that can threaten U.S. National Security" (Floyd, 2010, p. 89).
Despite facing congressional opposition, notably after the approval of the Byrd-Hagel
Resolution, which prevented the United States from ratifying any agreement that did not set
binding targets for all the nations involved, the Clinton Administration actively participated in the
negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol established limits to greenhouse gases
(GHG) emissions for the most industrialized countries and economies in transition; 38 countries
committed to emission reductions. For the first time, an international agreement set mandatory
limits for GHG emissions.
Mainly due to the U.S. influence, the Protocol created financial mechanisms, which
allowed, for example, the possibility of exchanging emission limits between nations and the
creation and trade of carbon credits (Hahn et al., 2002).

Despite its involvement in the
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negotiations, the Clinton Administration did not submit the Protocol to Congress since it realized
the meager chances to be approved. As a result, the Clinton Administration could not restore the
country's leadership in environmental issues, whereas European countries started to occupy a
vanguard position (Milkoreit, 2019). As Dunlap et al. (2016) indicate, since 1994, when
Republicans gained control of Congress, the Clinton Administration realized that the window of
opportunity to deal with climate change had closed.
According to Floyd (2010, p. 90), Bill Clinton's environmental security defense strategy
had positive results, such as creating a stable annual budget of U$S 5 billion. The author notes that
the advancements in the environmental area were largely the result of the enforcement of already
existing state, federal, and international environmental legislation, which can be explained by the
opposition to create new laws. The Clinton Administration faced in Congress to pass new
environmental laws. he Clinton Administration brought the environmental security agenda to an
unprecedented level of priority. The environmental agenda listed climate change among other
environmental threats during the Clinton Administration, such as biodiversity loss, ozone layer
depletion, air pollution, etc. Climate change, still often referred to as "global warming," had still
not assumed the same relevance that the theme has today. Daynes and Sussman (2010, p. 89)
highlight this aspect of President Clinton’s speech: "similar to most people during the 1990s, he
used the terms - climate change and global warming interchangeably throughout his presidency.
He referred to global warming 240 times from 1993 until the end of his second term in 2001.
During the same period, he referred to climate change 284 times."
The complexity of climate disruption brought by the increase of the Earth's temperature
was still not as palpable as today. Relatively few specific measures to deal with climate change
were implemented during the Clinton period, comparing to more recent Democratic
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Administrations. The primary domestic policy to deal with this issue was the 1993 "Climate
Change Action Plan," without tangible results. In foreign policy, the most significant contribution
of the Clinton Administration to climate security was its participation in the negotiations that led
to the Kyoto Protocol and in those that followed its signature. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier,
since 1994, when Republicans gained control of Congress, the Clinton Administration's window
of opportunity to deal with environmental issues, and especially the climate change, closed
(Dunlap & McCright, 2010).
Thus, progress became more visible in international negotiations when congressional
approval was not necessary. In the international negotiations, the Clinton Administration favored
climate change-supported cost-effective strategies, including market-based instruments,
particularly cap-and-trade mechanisms. For Hahn et al. (2002, p. 31), the Clinton Administration
was largely responsible for the inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol of "significant provisions for
international emissions trading and joint implementation projects among the industrialized nations,
as well as what came to be known as the Clean Development Mechanism for offsets in developing
countries."
Despite the failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, Bill Clinton remained clear concerning the
climate threats until the end of his mandate. He mentioned climate change in every State of the
Union Address from 1998 to 2000. In 2000, his last State of the Union Address followed the same
pattern: "The greatest environmental challenge of the new century is global warming. The
scientists tell us the 1990'swere the hottest decade of the entire millennium. If we fail to reduce the
emission of greenhouse gases, deadly heat waves and droughts will become more frequent, coastal
areas will flood, and economies will be disrupted. That is going to happen unless we act" (Clinton,
2000a).
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The speech analysis of Clinton's discourses reveals the emphasis given to environmental
(and climate change) securitization during his Administration. The narrative structure specific to
securitization is respected in several opportunities: the designation of climate change as an
existential threat to a referent object (humanity), requiring exceptional measures. A sense of
urgency also characterizes the discourse through the speaker's attempts to accentuate the
seriousness of the threat. Nevertheless, the Copenhagen Schools' criteria demand that the audience
accept the exceptional measures proposed. Thus, one can question the effectiveness of the rhetoric
in this regard, considering the level of opposition the Clinton Administration faced in the U.S.
Congress, as shown by the literature review.
6.2

The George W. Bush Administration (2001-2009)
The two George W. Bush Administrations released two National Security Strategies (2002

and 2006). In the NSSs, "environment" was mentioned: four times in 2002, and three times in
2006. Climate change was mentioned twice in the 2002 NSS and not mentioned in the 2006 NSS.
These documents' rare references to climate change or other environmental problems suggest a deemphasis on environmental security.
The 2002 NSS reacts to the September 11 attacks and is dominated by the global war on
terrorism and codifies “the Bush Doctrine". The Bush Doctrine advocates maintaining the United
States military supremacy in the world, if necessary, through preventive war against the
dissemination of weapons of mass destruction. The doctrine supported the global promotion of
human rights and freedoms through military means, if necessary. These goals justified an attempt
to rebuild the Arab world into the "Greater Middle East." The Bush doctrine softened during the
second presidential term.
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The 2002 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement defines its main
objectives: a) to defend peace, to fight "terrorists and tyrants"; b) preserve peace, "build good
relations between the great powers," and c) extend peace, "encourage free and open societies on
all continents" (Bush, 2002a, p. 1). Environmental issues are mentioned, not as threats, and listed
together with worker protection: "The United States must foster economic growth in ways that will
provide a better life along with widening prosperity. We will incorporate labor and environmental
concerns into U.S. trade negotiations, creating a healthy "network" between multilateral
environmental agreements with the WTO, and use the International Labor Organization, trade
preference programs, and trade talks to improve working conditions in conjunction with freer
trade" (Bush, 2002a, p. 19).
In the 2002 NSS, a distant association between climate and security could hardly be
qualified as securitization. It further illustrates the lukewarmness concerning the recognition of the
climate threat. The discourse denies contradiction between economic growth and climate change
under a win-win paradigm: growth is not the antithesis of climate protection but one of its
conditions. Along with environmental issues, energy security is listed: "We will also continue to
work with our partners to develop cleaner and more energy-efficient technologies. (...) Economic
growth should be accompanied by global efforts to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations
associated with this growth, containing them at a level that prevents dangerous human interference
with the global climate" (Bush, 2002a, p. 19) . Distant from a logic of cooperation, the document
portrays developing countries, naming China and India (p. 20) as the major emitters, and does not
propose an exceptional measure to securitize the climate at the international level.
The 2006 National Security Strategy Report follows the same line as the previous one,
stressing the U.S. economy and the threat of terrorism. The NSS brings attention to floods,
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hurricanes, earthquakes, and tsunamis as non-traditional national security themes that may become
threats to national security: "environmental destruction, whether caused by human behavior or
cataclysmic mega disasters such as flood, hurricanes, earthquakes or tsunamis" (Bush, 2006, p.
47). Nevertheless, neither the catastrophes caused "by human behavior" nor the behavior that leads
to the catastrophes are defined. The document highlights the responses to hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, which required a comprehensive strategy of communication and coordination with the federal
government. Environmental concerns in the 2006 NSS were not described as environmental
security but rather as general emergencies and were not associated with anthropogenic factors.
In the 2006 NSS, the lines between traditional and environmental security remain blurred.
The military was seen as capable of providing logistical support in natural disasters:
"Environmental destruction, whether caused by human behavior or cataclysmic mega-disasters
such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, or tsunamis. Problems of this scope may overwhelm the
capacity of local authorities to respond, and may even overtax national militaries, requiring a larger
international response".
Furthermore, the 2006 NSS also addresses energy security and independence, focusing on
searching for clean and sustainable energy sources. The War in Iraq had raised awareness about
dependence on oil imports and the regimes that the U.S. was financing with its imports. This
concern with energy dependency had resulted in the 2005 Energy Policy Act, which approved tax
cuts as incentives for individuals and companies to consume energy-efficient equipment. The 2006
State of the Union address also presented this concern: "Keeping America competitive requires
affordable energy. And here we have a serious problem: America is addicted to oil, which is often
imported from unstable parts of the world. The best way to break this addiction is through
technology" (Bush, 2006).
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Other Bush Administration speeches also illustrate the dissociation between climate
change and security. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, President Bush linked
the destruction in New Orleans with the narrative of the war on terror or weapons of mass
destruction, not climate change, confirming that environmental disasters were not cast in the
climate security narrative: "We must have plans to evacuate large numbers of people in an
emergency and to provide food, water, and security as needed. In a time of terror threats and
weapons of mass destruction, the danger is greater than a fault line or flood plain. Emergency
planning is a national security priority" (Bush, 2005). Since the catastrophic event was not
described as a hypothetical consequence of climate change, no association with any anthropogenic
factor is established. For the Copenhagen School, only human actions that affect natural systems
are considered within the range of environmental security.
Furthermore, President Bush, in a speech "President Bush Discusses Global Climate
Change, "released on June 11, 2001, minimizes the impacts of climate change to justify withdrawal
from the Kyoto Protocol: "We do not know how fast change will occur, or even how some of our
actions could impact it. And, finally, no one can say with any certainty what constitutes a
dangerous level of warming, and therefore what level must be avoided" (Bush, 2001). This rhetoric
is the opposite of a sense of urgency that should characterize a securitization move, according to
Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 23-25).
If speeches often do not mention climate change, political actions demonstrate more
concrete steps to desecuritize the issue. From the beginning, there was a departure from the
previous Administration's climate policies, which included eliminating the office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Environmental Security (Funke, 2011, p. 74). Once in office,
President Bush began to publicly criticize the Kyoto Protocol, as he had already done during the
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election campaign, questioning the exclusion of developing economies such as India and China
and the impact of international competition for the United States. Even in the face of repeated
criticism from countries that had already adhered to the climate agreement, President Bush keep
this position against climate change policies.
In March 2001, the Bush Administration declared that it would not implement the Kyoto
Protocol. President Bush stated in a letter to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts dated
March 6, 2001: "As you know I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the
world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would
cause serious harm to the U.S. economy. The Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of
addressing global climate change concerns" (Bush, 2001a). The refusal to accept climate change
as a serious threat to the entire planet is not conducive to macrosecuritization attempts.
Consequently, the Bush discourse on climate change does not break with the antagonism and the
zero-sum game associated with traditional security. The rhetoric of cooperation with emerging
economies, such as China and India, does not develop in the speech.10
In the last year of his second mandate, in a speech on June 18, 2008, at the Rose Garden,
"Remarks on America's Energy Predicament," President Bush announced the expansion of the
U.S. shale, oil and gas production, and new areas for exploration and exploitation that included
environmentally protected areas of the territory. All these policies contribute to GHG emissions
and could have multiple environmental impacts. Finally, as part of the so-called "midnight
regulations," a series of deregulatory measures with severe environmental impacts were passed
(Floyd, 2010, p. 166).
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The Bush Administration adopted some measures favorable to reducing carbon emissions.
For example, in 2005, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) was
announced at an ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) summit. This initiative of the
Bush Administration was joined by Australia, South Korea, the People's Republic of China, Japan,
and India, and, in 2007, Canada. The Partnership called on governments and the private sector of
member countries to accelerate the use of clean energy technologies and to review their goals for
energy, clean development and change climate (Floyd, 2010, p. 160). Moreover, the Energy
Independence and Security Act (EISA) in 2007 included incentives for biofuels, the
implementation of more efficient energy use and efficiency standards for light motor vehicles
(Floyd, 2010, p. 159). However, these initiatives have been criticized for not establishing goas for
GHG emissions reduction.
The deficit of attention to environmental security or other soft issues at the beginning of
the Bush Administration can be to a certain degree explained by the September 11 events, followed
by the fight against terrorism and the Second Gulf War. In a situation of military confrontation, all
attention, efforts, and funding tend to concentrate on the conventional security apparatus.
Furthermore, the main arguments for expanding the U.S. energy autonomy were related to
September 11. For Floyd (2010, p. 127), Bush's foreign policy was indistinct from the fight against
terrorism, and environmental security was seen as opposed to the national defense or economy.
Thus, in parallel with actions against climate regulation, the Bush Administration boosted energy
policy to explore and consume fossil fuels. The Bush Administration submitted to Congress an
energy plan, which provided incentives for fossil fuels and nuclear energy. However, opposition
from the Democrats and various environmental organizations to the projects, which included
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authorization for oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge led to significant changes in
the final text.
During the Bush Administration, as a result of the congressional deadlock concerning
climate change, several U.S. states started playing a leading role in environmental and climate
policies. For example, in 2002, California passed a climate legislation, demanding from the
automobile industry the production of more efficient vehicles with lower emissions. Another
example is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, an effort initiated by the Northeast States in
2008. The initiative aims at creating a carbon emissions market and a fund to finance mitigation
programs (Rabe, 2009).
The Bush Administration also reflected a tendency in the Republican party to highlight
military or economic security to the detriment of environmental security, often viewing an
antagonism between the two. According to Funke (2011), "with the Administration of George W
Bush, the concept of environmental security seemed to disappear from view. The Administration's
ideology, and events during Bush's first term, diverted attention back toward military might and
generally ignored environmental considerations compared to immediate military advantage"
(Funke, 2011, p. 74). The construction of the Bush Administration discourse highlighting
economic security over environmental security is recurrent and reveals that the speech targets
conservative audiences. This speech is a general trend among conservatives, often very probusiness, seeing environmentalism as a potential threat by stimulating barriers for investments and
trade (Dunlap et al., 2001; Hochschild, 2018).
According to the Copenhagen School, a "desecuritizing move" implies that an actor
disassociates a referent object from an existential threat. Unlike the securitizing move, a
desecuritizing move can be silent and lead to the end of security practice (Floyd, 2008, p. 9). There
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was a tendency to deemphasize and depoliticize the climate as a security issue during both Bush
Administrations. Though the Bush Administration accepted the anthropogenic influence on
climate change11, a broad security complex, such as the proposed Kyoto Protocol, was considered
unnecessary and burdensome for the U.S. economy. Instead, the Administration often argued that
the issue could be dealt with more limited measures, such as environmentally friendly technologies
and renewable energy, without clear emission reduction goals. These measures, however, could
not be seen as "exceptional measures" in climate security since they related to programs that
primarily target energy independence and security, with eventual beneficial results in terms of
emission reduction.

6.3

The Barack Obama Administration (2009-2017)
Despite the consequences of the 2008 international economic crisis and domestic

opposition, progress in environmental and climate security can be noticed in top-level planning
documents during the Obama Administration. President Obama Administration published two
NSSs (2010 and 2015). The 2010 NSS mentions "environment" 23 times and climate change also
23 times. The 2015 NSS mentions the environment nine times and climate change fourteen times.
The speeches confirm the tendency of the environmental security agenda becoming assimilated by
the climate agenda; other potential candidates for environmental securitization, such as
biodiversity, forests, water, etc., almost faded away from speeches. Unlike the National Security
Strategies published during the Clinton Administration, the term "environmental security" is no

11

According to Floyd (2010, p. 156), President Bush formally acknowledged the human contribution to global
warming by 2007. This author contends that climate change had become more widely accepted by the U.S.
electorate and could not be ignored considering the elections in the next year. However, Bush's opinion shift on
climate change did not imply substantial policy changes. Many initiatives in the name of climate change had little to
do with curbing GHG emissions (p. 160).
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longer present in the two Obama Administration NSSs, though "moves" to securitize the
environment, notably the climate, are structured in the discourses.
In both National Security Strategies, several clues inform the securitizing character of the
discourse on the criteria set by the Copenhagen School. The narrative structure often points to a
specific securitization: the designation of an existential threat to a referent object requiring
exceptional measures. For instance, the 2010 NSS designates climate change as a serious threat:
"The danger from climate change is real, urgent, and severe. The change wrought by a warming
planet will lead to new conflicts over refugees and resources; new suffering from drought and
famine; catastrophic natural disasters; and the degradation of land across the globe" (Obama,
2010a, p. 47). Climate change ultimately threatens the whole globe as the referent object.
In the 2010 NSS, the proposed exceptional measures include investments in renewable
energies and clean technologies, optimizing energy efficiency, assistance for developing countries
for adaptation, and technology transfer. President Obama's speech breaks with the main elements
of continuity regarding security concerning more traditional military threats. The geographical
amplitude and the long-term consequences of climate threat eschew antagonisms and rivalries and
favor cooperation and collective responsibility: "Our goal is an effective, international effort in
which all major economies commit to ambitious national action to reduce their emissions, nations
meet their commitments in a transparent manner, and the necessary financing is mobilized so that
developing countries can adapt to climate change, mitigate its impacts, conserve forests, and invest
in clean energy technologies. We will pursue this global cooperation through multiple avenues,
with a focus on advancing cooperation that works" (Obama, 2010a, p. 47).
Furthermore, the Obama Administration perceives climate change as a pressing global
threat that demands the establishment of a broad security complex because its views on the issue
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reflect the dominant position of scientific epistemic communities: "The United States will
therefore confront climate change based upon clear guidance from the science, and in cooperation
with all nations—for there is no effective solution to climate change that does not depend upon all
nations taking responsibility for their own actions and for the planet we will leave behind" (Obama,
2010a, p. 47).
In the 2015 NSS, the word "climate" or climate change" is mentioned nineteen times.
Climate change is designated as a major threat to the referent objects (the United States, the global
economy): "Climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security, contributing
to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like food and water.
The present-day effects of climate change are being felt from the Arctic to the Midwest. Increased
sea levels and storm surges threaten coastal regions, infrastructure, and property. In turn, the global
economy suffers, compounding the growing costs of preparing and restoring infrastructure”
(Obama, 2015a).
The 2015 NSS also highlights the exceptional measures that the Obama Administration
proposed to address the issue of climate change. For instance, the "Climate Action Plan" envisages
reducing emissions between 26-28% by 2025 compared to 2005 levels (Obama, 2015a, p. 12).
Internationally, the document announces that the United States and China had reached an
agreement to reduce their emissions and pledge to contribute to the "Climate Fund" (Obama,
2015a, p. 12). The idea that a global threat demands worldwide cooperation is implicit in the
speech.
On various occasions, President Barack Obama also associate "climate security" with
energy security and the dependence of the United States on foreign oil. President Obama's first
State of the Union Address in 2010 addressed energy consumption and efficiency. Nevertheless,
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differently from his predecessor, President Obama links oil and gas consumption directly to
climate change (instead of denying the association): "to create more of these clean energy jobs, we
need more production, more efficiency, more incentives. And that means building a new
generation of safe, clean nuclear power plants in this country. It means making tough decisions
about opening new offshore areas for oil and gas development. It means continued investment in
advanced biofuels and clean coal technologies. And, yes, it means passing a comprehensive energy
and climate bill with incentives that will finally make clean energy the profitable kind of energy
in America" (Obama, 2010).
Like Bill Clinton's discourse, the association of future generations with climate change,
which President Obama often makes in his speeches, is not trivial and can be perceived as a
rhetorical strategy to stress the need for exceptional measures: "And no challenge—no challenge—
poses a greater threat to future generations than climate change" (Obama, 2015a). The allusion of
future generations was also present in the 2013 State of the Union Address: "But if Congress won't
act soon to protect future generations, I will. I will direct my Cabinet to come up with executive
actions we can take, now and in the future, to reduce pollution, prepare our communities for the
consequences of climate change, and speed the transition to more sustainable sources of energy"
(Obama, 2013).
The Obama Administration's attempts to securitize the climate are also evident in policy
efforts. President Obama's choices for his staff on energy and climate issues were a break from
the former Administration and were praised by experts and environmentalists. For instance, John
Holdren, Professor of Environmental Sciences at Harvard, was appointed as Director of President's
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology. Stephen Chu, Noble Prize winner, and Physicist
at Berkeley was chosen as Energy Secretary. Todd Stern was chosen as the climate negotiator.
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Lisa Jackson, former head of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, was
appointed to the EPA. President Obama created at the White House the Office of Energy and
Climate Change Policy, headed by Carol Browner, former administrator of the EPA during the
Clinton presidency. The new decision-making configuration became much more favorable to
environmental associations and the non-governmental world as a whole (Bomberg & Super, 2009,
p. 427).
Berg (2017) classifies the Obama Administration policies in the environmental area as
“stealth environmentalism”. The author suggests that the Obama Administration did not move
away from its climate agenda but, notably in the first term, avoided direct conflicts with the
Congress. Due to the gridlock in Congress, President Obama developed alternative strategies to
foster climate change initiatives, which did not require congressional approval, for example,
through aid packages launched in response to the 2008 crisis. The budget expansion for climate
programs is another example of the Obama Administration's priority to climate change. In 2010,
this increase corresponded to more than three times the value of the first year of the Obama
government (Kincaid & Roberts, 2013).
In 2009, in the first year of his government, President Barack Obama signed the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act. This law of Keynesian inspiration envisaged significant domestic
investments in infrastructure, seeking to recreate the job market losses due to the economic crisis
while responding to climate and energy challenges. Moreover, President Obama supported the
American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey Bill), which aimed to establish a
carbon cap-and-trade market system similar to the European system, support the development of
renewable energies and demonstrate the United States' commitment to the fight against climate
change. The US House of Representatives approved the bill, appearing to usher in a new era in US
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climate policy. This legislation set, for the first time, concrete greenhouse gas emission targets for
the United States and signaled Washington's return to climate talks. The American Clean Energy
and Security Act passed the House of Representatives in 2009 but was never voted in the Senate
(Bodansky, 2016).
In 2013, the Obama Administration presented the Presidential Climate Action Plan, which
had three main axes. The first axis aimed to reduce carbon pollution through federal regulations
based on the Clean Air Act of 1970, eliminating the most polluting sources, such as the oldest
thermal power stations and modernizing power generation. The 2015 EPA's Clean Power Plan
intended to implement this part of the Presidents' Climate Action Plan. Furthermore, the Plan
favored renewable energy, the electrification of vehicles, and increasing energy efficiency at
homes. In the second axis, the Obama Administration committed to helping the states to strengthen
infrastructure as part of adaptation measures to climate change. Moreover, federal agencies were
encouraged to invest in infrastructure resilient to climate change. The third axis was to establish
international leadership in negotiations, sending a signal of the Administration’s engagement on
the international political scene.12
In February 2015, President Obama vetoed the bill to construct the Keystone Pipeline XL
(KXL) between Alberta, Canada, and Nebraska in the United States, which President George W.
Bush had previously approved. Likewise, at the end of the last year of his government, President
Obama vetoed the Dakota Access Pipeline, a pipeline linking North Dakota and Illinois.
Considering the difficulty to approve climate legislation in Congress, in addition to direct
presidential action, as in the case of pipelines, the creation of procedures and quality standards by

White House (2013). Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Climate Action Plan.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-climate-action-plan
12
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federal agencies also proved to be a viable alternative. In 2015, the Obama Administration
developed the Clean Power Plan, which established norms regulating carbon dioxide emission
standards. EPA enacted these norms; therefore, congressional approval was not necessary. The
White House used a juridical precedent of a court case to classify carbon dioxide as a pollutant
and regulate it based on the Clean Air Act. However, the Clean Power Plan was suspended after
lawsuits questioning its legality.
Moreover, the Obama Administration promoted the adaptation of the U.S. federal
government to climate change. A series of Executive Orders (E.O.s) required several agencies to
acknowledge climate change in their actions and policies, leading them to integrate climate change
into their mission objectives. E.O.s do not require congressional approval and could spotlight key
concepts around climate change. They called upon a reflection by the Federal Agencies on their
actions to mitigate impacts on the environment and foster measures for the adaptation to climate
change.
In 2009, President Obama signed Executive Order 13514: "Federal leadership in
environmental, energy and economic performance." This E.O. specifies that the federal
government must set an example in terms of environmental protection, energetic efficiency,
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, construction of sustainable buildings. Each year, the
agencies were required to publish a Sustainability Performance Plan. This plan specifies the
targeted goals, the actions implemented to achieve them, and the results achieved during the year.
The E.O. 13514 was expanded in 2015 by the E.O. 13693, "Planning for federal sustainability in
the next decade."
Following Executive Order 13514, President Obama signed a new Executive Order 13653
in 2013, "Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change," which aimed to prepare
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the country for future impacts caused by climate change and implement adapted risk management
strategies. This Executive Order created an Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force,
responsible for developing guidelines for climate adaptation and the "climate data" initiative,
aiming to collect and make climate data available to a broad public.
In the international domain, the renewed United States leadership positively affected the
negotiations. The Copenhagen and the Cancun agreements are a direct result of the involvement
of the U.S. Administration (Bodansky, 2016). Despite the prior refusal of the United States Senate
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the Obama Administration was active in international
discussions to reach a new agreement. The United States' participation in negotiations was
essential for developing a compromise in the Copenhagen Summit in 2009. In Copenhagen,
President Obama had a closed-door meeting with representatives from emerging economies, South
Africa, Brazil, China, and India. This meeting, parallel to COP-15, resulted in a framework of the
Copenhagen Accord.
The Copenhagen Agreement requires that the increase of global temperature stay below
2°C. However, the document did not establish binding strategies, mechanisms, targets, or
deadlines for its execution. The Obama Administration proposed emission reduction goals (17%
below 2005 levels by 2020, 42% by 2030, and 83% by 2050) less ambitious than those the Kyoto
initially proposed for the United States. The reduction goals established in Copenhagen were not
adopted in the Senate for lack of a majority.
COP-17, in Durban, 2011, created an ad hoc working group, which started negotiations
that led to the Paris Agreement. Emerging and developing countries agreed to negotiate a new
instrument that would impose obligations on all, fulfilling a requirement by the U.S. Senate for
U.S. participation in the negotiations. Considering the lack of approval of the Copenhagen
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Agreement, President Obama became more aware of the weight of the opposition in the Senate for
ratification of any international climate agreement. This reality led to innovation in the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change negotiations, agreed in 2015 at COP-21.
The Paris Agreement was the first international agreement that established a universal
target to limit global warming but on voluntary basis. The Agreement determines that the global
temperature increase should not exceed 2°C, but the signatory countries will endeavor that such a
variation does not exceed 1.5ºC. The main argument for the nonbinding characteristic of the Paris
Agreement was presented by the United States delegation, considering the unlikelihood of
approving binding instruments in the U.S. Congress. Unlike the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the Paris
Agreement was a political agreement, which adopted a non-prescriptive "bottom-up" approach,
with less differentiated national commitments. This innovation in treaty architecture was essential
for the Paris Agreement's success (Dryzek & Pickering, 2019, p. 2019).
The analysis of the documents available reveals the centrality of climate change in the
Obama Administration’s discursive construction and policies, despite the unfavorable domestic
and international scenarios. In the speeches, the character of the designated threat, the referent
objects targeted, and the nature of the proposed exceptional measures lead to believe that the
Obama Administration represented a rhetorical shift in climate securitization. A call for
cooperation and solidarity tends to confirm that President Obama's speech breaks with the main
elements of continuity in terms of traditional security.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of President Obama's speech to securitize the climate was
limited by domestic partisanship and the global crisis. The most evident success of the Obama
Administration in the securitization of climate, the Paris Agreement, was possible because it
circumvented opposition in the Senate. This fact indicates a significant division in domestic
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audiences concerning extraordinary measures to deal with the issue, which later led to President
Trump's denunciation of the Agreement.
President Obama's discourse and climate policies can be considered essential steps in
climate securitization and may have coincided with a window of opportunity, which did not remain
open. The President's attempt was not convincing enough (for the audience in the U.S. Congress)
and can be seen as a securitizing move. Normative changes in security are not trivial and demand
time. As discussed later, President Joe Biden will reestablish many aspects of President Obama's
discourse and policies on climate security.
6.4

The Donald Trump Administration (2016 – 2020)
During the Trump Administration, the depoliticization of climate security contrasts with

the securitizing emphasis given by the previous Obama Administration and the progress of
securitization efforts globally. The Trump Administration published one National Security
Strategy in 2017. In the 2017 National Security Strategy Report, "climate change" is not
mentioned. Climate policies are tied to energy policies: "Climate policies will continue to shape
the global energy system" (Trump, 2017a, p. 22). On the other hand, "immigration" is a new issue
compared with former Administrations and appears fourteen times and "immigrants" three times.
Instead of highlighting environmental security, the 2017 NSS establishes an antagonism
between economy and environmental politics: "Excessive environmental and infrastructure
regulations impeded American energy trade and the development of new infrastructure projects"
(Trump, 2017a, p. 18). The idea of excessive regulation due to environmental concerns is recurrent:
"The United States will promote clean and safe development of our energy resources, while
limiting regulatory burdens that encumber energy production and constrain economic growth"
(Trump, p. 19).
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The recurrent message in the 2017 NSS is "a strong America." The document highlights
the need to protect the country, foster its economic prosperity and global influence, and preserve
peace. The document, in the Preamble, summarizes the threats to the United States, as seen by the
Trump Administration, which includes biothreats, weapons of mass destruction, pandemics,
terrorism, and military and geostrategic threats represented by some countries such as Iran and
North Korea (Trump, 2017a, pp. 1-2). In the Introduction, besides the threats specified in the
Preamble, China and Russia are defined as primary rivals to the county.
The NSS does not associate "natural disasters" with climate change. Moreover, often in the
text, there is an association between natural disasters and terrorist attacks: "... in the event of natural
disaster or attack on our homeland" (Trump, 2017a, p. 7). As in documents elaborated by the
George W. Bush Administration, the lines between traditional and environmental security remain
blurred. In the chapter "Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of
Life," there is no mention of eventual adaptation or mitigation policies in case of more recurrent
natural disasters due to climate change.
Unlike preceding NSS reports, including those elaborated by Republican Administrations,
the 2017 NSS emphasizes economic threats represented by the immigrants. The document stresses
that immigration and lack of border control as possible threats: "strengthening control over our
borders and the immigration system is central to national security" (Trump, 2017a, p. 8). The 2017
NSS stresses immigration as a threat to referent objects in the social and economic sectors
(American jobs and way of life): "Illegal immigration, however, burdens the economy, hurts
American workers, presents public safety risks, and enriches smugglers and other criminals"
(Trump, 2017a, p. 9).13

13

This securitization move against immigration innovates the rhetoric, as it evades the state-centrism that
characterizes the traditional security but preserves its dynamics in terms of antagonism against the 'alien other".
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The Trump Administration produced three State of the Union Addresses in 2018, 2019,
2020. The world "environment" only appears in one paragraph in the 2020 State of the Union
Address: "To protect the environment, days ago I announced that the United States will join the
One Trillion Trees Initiative, an ambitious effort to bring together government and private sector
to plant new trees in America and all around the world." There is no mention of "climate" or
"climate change." As in the 2017 National Security Strategy, other themes, such as uncontrolled
immigration, were seen as more urgent and menacing than environmental issues. In these
speeches, among the exceptional measures to counter the immigration threat, President Trump
often tried to convince the U.S. Congress about the importance of constructing the wall on the
Southern Border, as in the 2019 State of the Union Address: "walls save lives."
President Trump, in his four-paragraph statement on Earth Day, April 2017, reinforces his
commitment to the preservation of the United States' natural resources, not mentioning climate
change: “My Administration is committed to keeping our air and water clean, to preserving our
forests, lakes, and open spaces, and to protecting endangered species” (Trump, 2017b). He
highlights that "economic growth enhances environmental protection" (Trump, 2017b), and, in so
doing, suggests that environmental issues could be regulated by the economic system. The
discourse that economic growth would lead to environmental protection suggests that regulation
in this sector would unnecessarily burden U.S. workers and companies. Contrary to this view, any
regulation, including the environmental or climate ones, usually indicates market externalities; the

Thus, the extraordinary measures proposed, as in conventional security, involve coercion in the case, border
militarization. The word "immigrant" is mentioned three times in the text in laudatory or neutral terms, "the
contributions immigrants have made to our Nation throughout its history" (Trump, 2017a, p. 9). On the other hand,
mentioned fourteen times in the document, "immigration" is depicted as a negative phenomenon.
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problems will not be solved in that sector by the "market's invisible hand" without governmental
intervention.
Mentions to climate change appear significantly less frequently in the Trump discourses
than in the previous Administrations. President Trump more often revealed his positions
concerning climate change to the press or published them in his social media. On June 1, 2017, on
"Remarks Announcing United States Withdrawal from the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change Paris Agreement," President Trump justifies the withdrawal from the
Agreement based on the negative impacts on the U.S. economy: "As President, I can put no other
consideration before the well-being of American citizens. The Paris climate accord is simply the
latest example of Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United States to
the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American workers—who I love—and taxpayers
to absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished
economic production”. Once again, an antagonism between climate security and the economy is
established. Though not formally denying the consequences of the climate threat, the speech
suggests that the Paris Agreement represents a more severe threat to the United States and its
economy than the climate change itself.
In his social media, President Trump went even further in his attempts to deny the climate
threat by affirming, for instance, that "global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order
to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive." He has also criticized the "perennial prophets of
doom and their prediction of the apocalypse" and "global warming hoaxters." The scientific data
is essential to developing environmental policies and establishing climate change as a threat;
therefore, doubting scientific data on the issue equals to desecuritizing move. Though informal
and often not always harmonious with previous messages on the same issue, his social media
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content had the power to influence public opinion and revealed climate desecuritization, which
more formal sources do not reveal. 14
In terms of implemented policies, the Trump Administration agenda represented a shift
from Barack Obama's environmental actions, notably in carbon reduction. In the first month of his
Government, President Trump issued Executive Orders to speed up authorization for high-priority
projects. The Trump Administration asked TransCanada to request again authorization to build the
KXL pipeline and reinitiated the Dakota Access Pipeline's project. Trump promoted increased
fossil fuel use and rolled back Obama Administration regulations, such as the Clean Power Plan,
which aimed to strengthen consumption standards for motor vehicles (Selby, 2019).
Trump implemented the "America First Energy Plan," aiming at increasing employment
in the non-renewable energy industries, mainly coal (Hermwille & Sanderink, 2019). Trump's
choices for his staff show close ties with business. The management of environmental agencies,
notably the EPA, was handed over to pro-carbon actors such as Scott Pruitt (and later Andrew
Wheeler). Through EPA, the Administration suspended regulation on methane emissions (another
GHG), approved more flexible air quality standards for motor vehicles and end climate adaptation
programs. The Republican Administration was criticized for undermining the institutions'
regulatory capacity (Antadze, 2019).
Concerning the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the Trump Administration had a
similar position to George W. Bush's definitive rejection of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, but both
national and international contexts were different. Deese (2017) highlights that in 2015
investments in clean energy accounted for twice the resources invested globally in fossil fuels that

14

Cheung, H. (2020). What does Trump actually believe on climate change? BBC News, 23; Wong, E. (2016).
Trump has called climate change a Chinese hoax. Beijing says it is anything but. New York Times, 11(18), 2016.
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year. Several nations adopted alternative sources of energy much faster than predicted. The author
also points out that only in the United States, between 2008 and 2016, carbon emissions resulting
from power generation fell 11%, while economic growth continued to rise.
The Trump Administration's environmental discourses analysis reveals attempts to
desecuritize climate change, favoring other ontological threats such as immigration in speech
(Hermwille & Sanderink, 2019; Selby, 2019). The Trump Administration mentions climate change
much less frequently than its predecessors in official documents. Consequently, it does not propose
"exceptional measures" to the problem. The desecuritization in climate change was more often
associated with not mentioning the issue in speeches or not presenting it as an urgent matter.
Compared to previous Administrations, discourses on climate change were more clearly adjusted
to a specific domestic audience. While the 2017 National Security Strategy did not mention climate
change, the issue could be more present and submitted to a negative politicization in statements
and interviews to the press. This negative politicization was more perceptible in his social media.
6.5

The Joe Biden Administration (2021 - present)
In March 2021, the Biden Administration published the "Interim National Security

Strategic Guidance.". The world "environment" (with an ecological meaning) is mentioned one
time, and "environmental security" also one time. Climate change is mentioned fourteen times in
the document. According to the Copenhagen School framework, some elements present in Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance indicate its securitizing character. First, the seriousness of
climate change as a threat to the referent objects (the United States and the world): "The climate
crisis has been centuries in the making, and even with aggressive action, the United States and the
world will experience increasing weather extremes and environmental stress in the years ahead."
(Biden, 2021a, p. 11)
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The call to action and an easily identifiable dynamics of urgence are also perceptible: "But,
if we fail to act now, we will miss our last opportunity to avert the most dire consequences of
climate change for the health of our people, our economy, our security, and our planet" (Biden,
2021a, p. 12). The nature of the exceptional measures mentioned by President Biden to confront
the climate threat reflects the referent object in the discourse (ultimately the planet). Their
implementation requires innovation ("clean energy transformation") and international cooperation:
"in the coming months, we will convene the world's major economies and seek to raise the
ambition of all nations, including our own, to rapidly lower global carbon emission." (p. 12).
Governments are thus called upon to work together to overcome the climate threat. These
proposed measures in climate securitization deviate considerably from the traditional
securitization standards. The military aspects remain non-existent in the discourse on climate
securitization. Furthermore, President Biden argues that this global effort implies assisting more
vulnerable countries: "enhancing resilience to climate change at home and in vulnerable countries"
(Biden, 2021, p. 12). As described by the securitizing actor, the consequences of climate change
are vast in terms of geographic range and with a long-term effect; thus, the securitizing efforts
should transcend national rivalries and call upon cooperation and collective responsibility.
In climate change, the document transcends the rivalry with China and proposes active
U.S. engagement with that country to meet this challenge. This perspective harmonizes with the
Copenhagen School view that global ontological threats such as climate change can foster a sense
of shared identity and, in so doing, a chance for a broad security complex, which should be rooted
in international cooperation rather than rivalries. This perspective would transcend the antagonistic
logic associated with traditional security in foreign affairs (Trombetta, 2008). Unlike climate
change, when it comes to other threats, the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance

67
establishes a security narrative in harmony with a more conventional view of security, indicating
that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are testing U.S. strength in various ways.
President Biden links "climate" with "security" in other discourses. For instance, on
January 27, 2021, in his remarks before signing executive actions on tackling climate, President
Biden stated, "I'm signing today also makes it official that climate change will be at the center of
our national security and foreign policy" (Biden, 2021b). In a speech on January 27, 2001,
President Biden described climate change as an "existential threat.” The designated referent object
"the planet" shows universalism. Other more particular referent objects were mentioned, such as
military installations.
President Biden proposes a series of exceptional measures for mitigation and adaptation
beyond designating the climate threat.

In terms of mitigation, he offers using the federal

government's purchasing power to buy clean, invest in clean energy sources and stop federal
subsidies to fossil fuel projects. He also suggests adaptation initiatives to climate change, such as
modernizing water systems, construction, transportation, and energy infrastructure to endure the
consequences of extreme climate. He describes a win-win relation between climate securitization,
the economy, jobs, and technological development: "dealing with this existential threat to the
planet and increasing our economic growth and prosperity are one in the same" (Biden, 2021b).
President Biden has been evident in his policies to securitize climate change, manifesting
the United States' objective to become the world leader in climate securitization. In the Biden
Administration, climate transition is integrated transversally into all economic decisions. The
Biden Administration created the Office of Domestic Climate Policy that former EPA Director
Gina McCarthy lead as the National Climate Advisor and the chair of the National Climate Task
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Force. The National Climate Task Force aims to mobilize all agencies at the Federal level to
include so that they may include measures against climate change in their plans.
Biden's first actions on the climate have been to revoke a good number of Trump's
Executive Orders, including re-entry into the Paris Agreement, as well as the blocking of the
construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, the prohibition of drilling in the National Wildlife
Refuge in the Arctic; likewise, federal agencies were ordered to purchase only pollution-free
electricity and zero-emission vehicles, and the leasing of public lands for offshore oil and gas
exploitation was halted.
The Administration presented in 2021 Build Back Better (BBB) budget plan, subdivided
into American Rescue Plan, the American Jobs Plan and American Families plan. The American
Jobs plan was largely incorporated in the "Infrastructure Bill" (Infrastructure Investment and Jobs
Act was signed into law on November 15th 2021. The 1,2 trillion-dollar bipartisan bill intends to
stimulate job creation, modernize roads and bridges and other infrastructure, adapt them to climate
change, expand broadband, and give an advantage to the country in world economic competition.
Concerning climate change, the Build Back Better includes mitigation efforts such as
investments in clean energies, strengthening electric mobility, modernization of buildings, and
improvement of the electricity network and infrastructure to reduce emissions and the impact on
the climate. Nevertheless, the suppression of the Clean Electricity Performance Program (CEPP)
in the plan has reduced its ambition. Still, it keeps a significant budget dedicated to the fight against
climate change (US$ 555 billion) that, if approved, will be the most ambitious "green" investment
project ever adopted by the United States.15
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- Wingrove & Wasson (2021). Biden Goes All-In to End Deadlock With $1.75 Trillion Blueprint.
Bloomberg.Com, N.PAG.
- Goodkind (2021). What's in—and what's out—of Biden's new $1.75 trillion Build Back Better reconciliation plan.
Fortune.Com, N.PAG.
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While climate change is a high priority in President Joe Biden's Administration, the small
Democratic majority in Congress may limit climate ambitions. Thus, as in previous Democratic
Administrations, regulatory action may have an essential role in climate action. Michael Regan,
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has declared his intention to
formulate an aggressive plan regardless of the outcomes in Congress. In particular, the measures
should target methane emissions from oil and gas operations. However, this regulatory path
remains fragile since an Executive Order can easily be overturned by the next Administration,
which has happened before.
The Administration has also been very active in the climate securitization efforts in foreign
policy. In April 2021, President Joe Biden, in his speech at The Summit of Leaders on Climate,
highlighted the U.S. return to the fight against climate change. Joe Biden has pledged to decrease
greenhouse gas emissions by the United States from 50% to 52% by 2030 compared to 2005, as a
part of the country's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), a higher commitment than
President Obama's (Lepesant, 2021). Furthermore, the country intends to reach carbon neutrality
by 2050.

He urged the rest of the world to follow America's lead on behalf of a "moral and

economic imperative," explaining that the world must "take action” (Biden, 2021c).
In the 2021 Glasgow Climate Change Conference, COP-26, President Biden sought to
highlight the United States’ leadership in the international climate negotiations. In his national
opening speech on November 1, President Biden indicated that COP26 should launch a "decade
of action" for climate change, mentioning an "economic" and "moral" imperative. The United
States is not only "back to the table" but wants to lead this endeavor (Biden, 2021c). President
Biden reiterated his commitment to halve the United States’ greenhouse gas emissions by 2030

- Cook (2021). Biden's Trying to Sell His Economic Plan. Americans Don't Know What's in It. Bloomberg.Com,
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compared to 2005 levels. He announced that the United States will contribute for the first time to
the U.N. Adaptation Fund. At COP-26, the United States took part in important actions, notably
in two global alliances, to end deforestation by 2030 and reduce global methane emissions by 30
% between 2020 and 2030. Moreover, the United States and China announced a joint declaration
pledging to work on mitigation, adaptation, and to give financial support to developing countries.
The Biden Administration follows a similar path as its Democratic predecessors, promoting
climate change into the security domain, conveying a message of urgency and proposing
exceptional measures. Nevertheless, this emphasis on climate securitization seems much more
robust in President Biden's speech and initiatives than in former Administrations. Climate change
in the Biden Administration is present in a variety of policy sectors, from social policies to
economic development. The Biden's Administration intention to assume a leadership position in
the international climate talks can be perceived in initiatives like the Leaders' Summit, outside the
calendar of negotiations established by the United Nations.
The speech analysis demonstrated that, on several occasions, President Biden’s discourses
presented all the elements in the narrative structure conducive to climate securitization according
to the criteria set by the Copenhagen School.

Compared with the former Democratic

Administration, there was a clear evolution in climate discourses. Climate change is given much
more prominence in discourses as the major environmental threat, if not the only one. The referent
objects in climate securitization tend to be universal, and climate change is seen not only as a threat
multiplier but a threat in itself. The amplitude of climate threats leads to a very developed speech
on global cooperation breaking with the antagonistic logic usually associated with traditional
security, calling for international cooperation, including economic and geopolitical rivals such as
China. Some of the exceptional measures proposed by the Biden Administration are in the early
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stages, and many are under examination in the U.S. Congress. Some initiatives, such as the
infrastructure bill, were able to receive bipartisan support, but, at this time, it is too early to know
the level of acceptance that the securitizing discourse on climate change will meet in Congress.
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7

CONCLUSION

The research question that motivated this project was formulated as follows: "How has
climate security evolved in high-level United States political speeches in the post-Cold War?"
Discourses of post-Cold War U.S. Administrations were analyzed through the Copenhagen
School's securitization framework. Additionally, a review of each Administration’s policies added
more factual elements besides the interpretive research, highlighting the speeches' social, political,
and economic contexts.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the choice of the post-Cold War period for the analysis was
justified by the growing importance of climate change first as a political and later as a security
issue in this period. The evolution of climate security in the United States occurs in a historical
and international context that favored the politicization of environmental issues and the expansion
of the security agenda. The end of the Cold War fostered a perspective on security not exclusively
focused on state-centrism and military power and, in so doing, allowed the emergence of "soft
issues" in the security field.
Furthermore, scientific data was essential to bring awareness concerning the risks of
climate change.

The Second World War and the Cold War fostered the development of

technological innovation and the study of the physical environment, which have contributed to the
development of climatology. Most of the technology necessary to prove climate change, satellites,
radioactive tracing, digital computers, were developed and directly funded by the military sectors
in the Cold War context. As the climate threats became more palpable, the politicization around
climate change reached a new level as a security issue.
In the post-Cold War, foreign affairs and global crises have influenced the evolution of
U.S. political speeches and policies. During the George W. Bush Administration, the 9/11 attacks,
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the Second Gulf War, and the War on Terror favored a more traditional view of security to the
detriment of the incorporation of environmental security and other “soft issues” in the security
agenda at least in the first term. The 2008 economic crisis, during the Obama Presidency, was not,
in principle, a factor that favored climate securitization, as financial crises usually do not. The
allocation of resources for environmental securitization often becomes more complex during
crises, when economic policies need to stimulate recovery. Nevertheless, despite this unfavorable
global scenario and domestic opposition, the Obama Administration advanced climate themes,
particularly the Clean Power Plan, the Paris Agreement signature, and a series of Executive Orders.
Global factors can explain the development of climate security in U.S. political speeches
and policies in the post-Cold War. However, these factors cannot explain the almost pendular
variation in policies and speeches concerning climate regulation. As discussed in Chapter 3,
ideological and partisan divide in the United States became a particular feature of the political
debate concerning environmental issues, notably climate change, which should not be ignored
when policies and speeches are analyzed. The review of climate change policies by the U.S.
Administrations in the historical period shows that the political alternation between Democrats
and Republicans as a relevant factor explaining changes in discourses concerning climate security.
As illustrated by Table I, which summarizes the main actions on climate change during the
period covered by this research, policy decisions concerning climate change have been
characterized by changes of courses and reversals. The Bush Administration revoked President
Clinton's Climate Change Action Plan and did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. President Trump
followed the same trend: he reversed President Obama's Clean Power Plan in the first month in
office and later determined the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. In turn, the
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Biden Administration revoked many of President Trump's Executive Orders in the environmental
area and reentered the Paris Agreement on the first day in office.
These parallel situations should not be interpreted as mere repetitions; each Administration
developed specific strategies in distinct historical moments. The comparison between Democratic
and Republican Administrations reveals more significant differences in speech and policies
concerning climate change. Nevertheless, evolutions in discourses and policies are also noticeable
within each political camp.
TABLE I – CLIMATE INITIATIVES SUMMARY
President

Major climate change initiatives

Bill Clinton

Annual budget for environmental security
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental
Security
Climate Change Action Plan
Kyoto Protocol
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA)
Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP)
White House Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy
American Clean Energy and Security Act
Clean Power Plan
E.O. 13514: "Federal leadership in environmental, energy and
economic performance."
E. O. 13653: "Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate
Change,"
E.O. 13693: "Planning for federal sustainability in the next decade”.
The Copenhagen Agreement
The Paris Agreement
Specific initiatives were not identified
Suspension of Keystone XL pipeline permit and reversal of Trump
climate policies.
Suspension of drilling in Public Lands
Suspension of drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
Office of Domestic Climate Policy
National Climate Task Force
Build Back Better plan
Infrastructure bill
Organization of the Leaders Climate Summit
Return to the Paris Agreement

George W. Bush
Barack Obama

Donald Trump
Joe Biden
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Within the Democratic camp, the Clinton Administration had a central role in giving
legitimacy to environmental security. Climate change still had not reached the same prominence
as today and was dealt together with other environmental issues. A broader view of environmental
security is reflected by the creation of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Environmental Security. In terms of domestic policies, the most specific action concerning climate
change was the "Climate Change Action Plan," which had no tangible results concerning the
stabilization of emissions.
Compared to the Clinton Presidency, during the Obama Presidency, climate change
impacts were much more evident. Climate change became the only environmental threat presented
as an existential threat to humankind and ubiquitous in national or international security speeches.
The specific attention given to the issue is demonstrated at the institutional level by the creation
of an office in the White House (Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy). President Obama,
like President Clinton, framed climate change initiatives with a positive economic view. President
Obama proposed specific measures to combat climate change, the American Clean Energy and
Security Act, which aimed to create a cap-and-trade system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Considering the difficulty of approving climate legislation in Congress, the Obama Administration
built alternative strategies to these policies, especially through Executive Orders or EPA's
regulatory measures.
Compared to Clinton and Obama Administrations, mitigation and adaptation measures are
presented in much more detail and more ambitious goals by the Biden Administration. President
Joe Biden has been clear concerning the centrality of climate change, maybe the most central issue
for his Administration. Differently from previous Administrations, climate transition is integrated
transversally into virtually all social and economic decisions in President Biden’s government. On

76
his first day in office, President Biden recommitted the United States to the Paris Agreement with
bolder goals than former commitments, and he frames these climate goals to boost the economy
through job creation.
Within the Republican field, comparing the Trump Administration with the predecessor
Republican Administration, George H. Bush, it is possible to draw parallels in anti-climate
initiatives, such as the decisions to denounce the Paris Agreement and the refusal to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, it is necessary to highlight different contexts and historical realities.
President Trump expanded his energy policy to explore and consume fossil fuels in line with
previous Republican Administrations policies. However, in the Bush Administration, the driving
arguments for expanding U.S. energy reserves and autonomy were related to the September 11
attacks, which demanded a greater energy autonomy. Moreover, during the Bush Administration,
in the early 2000s, doubts still remained about the technical and financial feasibility of energy
alternatives for fossil fuels.
During the Trump Administration, there were already significant investments in clean
energy in the United States and other countries. The decisions to replace fossil fuels with
alternative energy sources could have a market sense and renewable energy market developed far
beyond initial forecasts. These technological and economic developments that offered alternatives
to the fossil fuel industry were not particularly visible during the George W. Bush Administration
but were more consolidated during the Trump Administration. President Trump's position differed
from the importance given to renewable energy by counterparts in Europe or countries like China,
which invests heavily in the sector. Today, positions that disregard energy transition may also
overlook market opportunities that economic sectors in the United States already see (Klass, 2021).

77
Furthermore, public opinion in the United States had already evolved concerning climate
change during the Trump Administration. In 2016, Gallup noticed that 64% of Americans were
concerned about global warming: among them, 59% thought global warming was already taking
place, and 65% believed that human activities caused global warming. Moreover, among U.S.
adults, 41% indicated they believe climate change represents a severe threat to their lifestyle,
compared to 37% in 2015. According to the survey, these figures show that "Americans are taking
global warming more seriously than at any time in the past eight years" (Saad & Jones, 2016). The
Yale Climate Change Communication Program observes that in 2019 69% of Americans believed
in climate change (Ballew et al., 2019).
Thus, more extraordinary than President Bush's positions, considering his historical
context, President Trump's policies concerning climate change seem to have evolved in a different
direction that could have been expected. These contradictions reinforce the argument of the
influence of partisanship on speeches and policy decision-making concerning climate change.
Moreover, the Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw from the Paris agreement in 2019,
and the speeches associated with this decision, can also be analyzed through the influence of the
partisan factor, mainly because the agreement is not legally binding. From the 195 signatories, the
United States was the only one that decided to withdraw, reinforcing the idea of exceptionalism in
the climate debate in the country.
Despite policies discontinuities and the difficulties in approving legislation at the Federal
level, the literature on evolving climate policy at subnational levels indicates progress starting in
the George W. Bush years. An evolution in the fight against climate change has been possible in
the United States, particularly by going beyond the federal decision-making framework (Selin &
VanDeveer, 2011).
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Compared with a review of policy initiatives, the speech analysis demonstrates harmony
between speeches and actions concerning climate securitization. As illustrated by Table II, the
discourses produced by Democratic Administrations (Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, Joe Biden)
overall presented climate change as a security issue, in light of the parameters adopted. On the
other hand, the Republican speeches (George Bush and Donald Trump) did not have all the
narrative elements that define climate securitization according to the Copenhagen School’s
criteria. These speeches could often be interpreted as climate desecuritization attempts, according
to these same criteria.
TABLE II - CLIMATE SECURITIZATION: NARRATIVE ELEMENTS
President

NSS

Referent Object

Exceptional Measures

Cooperation proposals

Clinton

1994

International stability

Partnership between
governments and NGOs.
Cooperation between
nations and regions.

Clinton

1995

International stability

Climate Change Action
Plan
The United States to
reduce its greenhouse
gas emissions to 1990
levels by the year 2000.
The United States to
reduce its greenhouse
gas emissions to 1990
levels by the year 2000.

Clinton

1996

International stability

Climate Change Action
Plan

Clinton

1997

Reducing the GHG
emissions.

Clinton

1998

Health of U.S.
citizens
The United States
The World
Not identified

Clinton

1999

U.S. Security and
well being

The Kyoto Protocol
Efficient transportation
systems
Alternative fuels
Kyoto Protocol
Limit greenhouse gases

Global Environmental
Facility
Partnerships between
governments and NGOs
Cooperation between
nations and regions
Global Environmental
Facility.
Joint Implementation to
help reduce emissions
abroad (part of Climate
Change Action Plan)
The Global Environmental
Facility

The Global Environmental
Facility
U.S. Initiative on Joint
Implementation.
Kyoto Protocol
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Clinton

2000

Health and economic
well-being of U.S.
citizens
The economy
Future generations
The U.S. security and
well-being

Bush

2002

Not identified

Bush

2006

Not identified

Obama

2010

The globe, the planet
Global stability

Obama

2015

The United States
The global economy

Trump
Biden

2017 Not identified
2021* The global economy
Global security
The Planet

Curb global warming
through the Kyoto
Protocol
Emissions reduction

Through the Kyoto
Protocol
Global Environmental
Facility
Bilateral programs for clean
energy and forest
preservation.
Assistance programs

Promote energy
efficient technologies
Promote nuclear energy
and clean coal.
Promote renewable
energy
New energy sources
Clean technologies
National actions to
reduce emissions and
their impact.

Not identified

Climate Action Plan

Not identified
Clean energy
transformation

Not identified
International cooperation
Assistance to developing
countries.
Cooperation with China in
climate change.
Support the resilience of
the poorest nations to the
effects of climate change.
Climate fund
International cooperation
Cooperation with China in
climate change.
Not identified
International cooperation
The Leaders’ Summit
Assistance to developing
countries
Cooperation with China in
climate change.

*Interim National Security Strategy Guidance

In discourses, Democratic Administrations overall presented the climate threat in similar
terms, associating climate change due to human activity. The referent objects show a substantial
degree of universalism; there is often a call for the planet or humanity's survival. The exceptional
measures proposed are consistent with the magnitude of a global threat, indicating that a specific
allocation of financial and technological resources is essential. The speeches do not establish an
antagonism between climate securitization and the economy. Indeed, they highlight the importance
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of protecting the economy from the effects of climate change as a secondary referent object and
suggest that is possible to reduce emissions without undermining growth and jobs.
The exceptional measures proposed in Democratic discourses fall into two categories:
mitigation and adaptation measures. The mitigation initiatives are reducing GHG emissions,
investments in renewable energies, and the development of new technologies. The discourses
indicate that these measures should be harmonious with a global and diplomatic strategy under the
United Nations umbrella and the principle of shared but differentiated responsibility. Often, the
discourses contend that international cooperation is essential for climate securitization,
transcending the antagonistic logic associated with traditional security in foreign affairs. Even
countries described as U.S. rivals in other sectors, such as China, are often introduced in speeches
on climate change as potential partners in the securitizing efforts.
Within the Democratic field, an evolution in a speech concerning climate change can be
identified in the period. In Bill Clinton's speeches, it is possible to discern the frequent use of
"global warming," a term that tends to be replaced by "climate change" in communications more
recently. The replacement of "global warming" by "climate change" happens as scientists and
epistemic communities show that the effects of greenhouse gases are broader and more complex
than the increase of the Earth's temperatures.
Moreover, environmental security progressively became almost synonymous with climate
security in discourses. In President Clinton's discourses, a broader concept of environmental
security was still perceptible compared to later Administrations. Climate change was often
included on a list of other environmental threats such as industrial pollution, deforestation, loss of
biodiversity, ozone depletion (Chart I). In the following Democratic Administrations, climate
change became virtually the only environmental issue presented as an existential threat to
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humankind (Chart II). Thus, the term "environmental security," which was recurrent in speeches
during the Clinton Administration, disappeared in discourses in the following Administrations
(Chart III).

Chart I: "Climate change" + "environment" in
National Security Strategy
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Category 1
1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2006

2010

2015

2017

2021

Series 11

Chart II: "Climate change" in National Security
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Chart III: "enviromental security" in National
Security Strategy
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For a full securitization, the Copenhagen School does not require that extraordinary
measures be adopted but requires that the audience be convinced of their necessity. The gridlocks
that remained in the legislature throughout the analyzed period indicate that securitization moves
did not convince political opposition in the United States Congress. Considering the U.S Congress
as the targeted audience, the review of each Administration’s policies does not corroborate the
idea that the specific speeches of the three Democratic Administrations represented full
securitization.
Thus, the speeches supporting climate securitization were interpreted as "securitizing
moves" and not full securitization. This result echoes the analysis of the Copenhagen School,
according to which environmental securitization attempts often fail to gather the necessary level
of support for their full realization (Buzan et al., 1998: p. 74). The process of securitizing the
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climate is a recent phenomenon, most often characterized by securitizing moves and not full
securitizations.
In contrast, the speech analysis demonstrated the Republican Administrations' discourses
show a tendency to desecuritize climate change. As illustrated in Table II, according to the
Copenhagen School criteria, the narrative elements that indicate securitization were not present in
Republican speeches when climate change was mentioned. As showed by the review of each
Administration’s policies, the attempts do desecuritize climate change did not remain rhetorical
but affected policy decisions and had concrete impacts. The depoliticization and the deemphasis
strategy often mean not mentioning the issue, not associating the phenomenon with anthropogenic
causes, or sometimes blurring the lines between traditional and environmental security. Republican
discourses tend to manifest a more "pro-business" character and are suspicious of regulations and
State intervention. The tendency to desecuritize or deemphasize climate change is more evident in
President Trump's speeches compared to President Bush's.
The review of climate policies demonstrates that the desecuritizing moves did not prevail.
Climate change gradually becomes a mainstream political issue on both sides of the political
spectrum. For the first time, Republicans sent a delegation to COP-26 in November 2021. 16 The
politicians' interest in climate change demonstrates that citizens, more and more concerned with
the issue, keep their influence on the U.S. political system. A Pew Research Center poll in 2020
found that 65% of Americans believed government action on climate change was too weak (Tyson
& Kennedy, 2020).

16

Joselow (2021). Meet the Republicans going to COP26. The Washington Post.
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Furthermore, in the global context, the efforts on climate securitization continued to be a
central issue. The exceptional response to President Joe Biden's invitation to The Summit of
Leaders on Climate, on April 22 this year, as preparation for COP-26 in Scotland, indicates that
climate security has not lost its momentum, quite the contrary. In the Summit, world leaders,
among the main responsible for gas emissions besides the United States, such as China and the
European Union, and those who have a crucial role in the fight against climate change, such as
India, Russia, Brazil, Canada, Australia, presented substantial pledges to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.
Thus, it is possible to affirm that climate securitization has evolved in the United States
discourses and policies during the post-Cold War period.

There is a gradual progression

characterized by periods of expansion and regression, mainly due to political and ideological
factors. The climate issue has not lost its importance and impetus over time, neither domestically
nor internationally. Furthermore, the climate threat has fostered a conceptual renewal of security
discourses in the United States regarding securitization. In speeches where it was possible to
identify climate securitization structure, the threat is not materialized as a specific enemy. The
referent object has a universal character, military solutions are not proposed. The speeches on
climate securitization often suggest many alternatives for international cooperation and break with
the continuity when compared to traditional military threats.
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